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INTRODUCTION

Arlene Renteria was a thirty-eight-year-old who died in 2003
1
from an infected bed sore.
Ms. Renteria suffered from
Huntington’s Chorea, a genetic disorder with symptoms including
uncontrolled movement, progressive dementia, psychoses, and an
increased risk for skin infection and weight loss due to the
2
degeneration of nerve cells in the brain. She lived at Covina
Rehabilitation Center from June 2000 to March 2003, when she was
3
admitted to the East Valley Hospital emergency room. Her care
plan at Covina Rehabilitation Center required the nursing staff to
monitor her skin for signs of infection each day and seek physician
4
treatment orders if any signs were found. Despite this plan, when
she was admitted to the hospital, she had lacerations on her toes
and feet, dark red squishy patches on her buttocks, a
staphylococcus infection on her left hand, and redness on the skin
5
of her lower back. Additionally, she was dehydrated from infective
diarrhea, malnourished, and had vaginal bleeding and a small
6
abrasion on her left minor labia. The infected bed sore on the
sacral area of her lower back caused her death several months
7
later.
Ms. Renteria’s heirs sued the nursing home and its parent
corporations, for dependent adult abuse, among other causes of
8
action. California’s Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act of
1975 (MICRA) places a cap of $250,000 on non-economic damages
9
such as pain and suffering in professional negligence cases. Prior
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Sababin v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 266, 269 (Ct. App. 2006).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 268.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2(a)–(b) (West 1997); see also Bernadette Stafford,
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to 1991, California trial lawyers argued that MICRA “markedly
depresses the number of claims” against nursing homes and made
“most nursing home cases ‘zero damages’ cases because the cost of
10
litigation exceeds the potential value of the award.”
Consequently, personal injury attorneys were hesitant to take
professional negligence cases that involved elder and dependent
11
adult abuse.
In 1991, in response to this hesitation, the California
Legislature amended its original elder abuse act, creating the Elder
Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act (EADACPA),
which gives attorneys more incentive to represent clients such as
Ms. Renteria’s heirs by increasing the remedies available for
12
substantiated cases of abuse and neglect.
Under EADACPA,
plaintiffs must prove by clear and convincing evidence that a
defendant is liable for neglect or physical abuse, and that the
13
defendant acted with recklessness, oppression, fraud, or malice. If
successful, the plaintiff can recover attorney fees and costs, as well
as damages for the decedent’s pain and suffering, in addition to
14
compensatory damages. EADACPA excludes liability for simple,
15
or even gross, professional negligence, which is compensated
16
instead under the MICRA tort caps. Thus, the gravamen for an
elder or dependent abuse lawsuit against a health care professional
in California is whether the defendant’s actions are egregious
enough to constitute elder or dependent adult abuse, rather than
17
simple professional negligence.
Expeditious Efforts for the Elderly: Covenant Care, Inc. v. Superior Court, 39 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 699, 708 (2006) (explaining several ways in which MICRA provisions
restrict possible awards to plaintiffs).
10. Michael L. Rustad, Neglecting the Neglected: The Impact of Noneconomic
Damage Caps on Meritorious Nursing Home Lawsuits, 14 ELDER L.J. 331, 371 (2006).
11. See Marc Hankin, The Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act
(CHAP. 774, STATS. 1991), 26 BEVERLY HILLS B. ASS’N J. 18, 19 (Winter 1992)
(noting that, after 1991, “it will no longer be cheaper to kill an old person than
injure one.”).
12. Stafford, supra note 9, at 704.
13. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 15657 (West Supp. 2010).
14. Id.
15. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 15657.2 (West 2001); see also Stafford, supra
note 9, at 713 (explaining that under the Elder Abuse Act, petitioners must show
proof of a “reckless, malicious, oppressive, or fraudulent act” to obtain enhanced
remedies).
16. CAL. CIV. CODE. § 3333.2(a) (West 1997).
17. The most insightful examination of the distinction between elder abuse
and medical malpractice is Bryan Carney, Crossing the Line: Litigation of Elder Abuse
Claims Hinges on the Distinction Between Professional Negligence and Actual Abuse, 30
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18

In Sababin v. Superior Court, Ms. Renteria’s heirs appealed the
trial court’s grant of summary judgment on the issue of dependent
abuse after it found that there was no evidence that the defendants
19
were guilty of more than professional negligence.
In its
unpublished opinion, the California Court of Appeal, Second
20
District, Division 2, relied on the holding of Delaney v. Baker, a
21
1999 opinion from the California Supreme Court. The appellate
court reversed the trial court and held that there were triable issues
as to whether Covina Rehabilitation Center’s employees were guilty
of reckless, oppressive, or malicious neglect when they failed to
follow Ms. Renteria’s care plan for maintaining the health of her
22
skin. Because California’s Appellate Rule 8.1115(a) prohibits the
citation of or reliance upon an unpublished decision, Sababin is
unavailable to use as precedent as it had not been selected for
23
publication. The court acceded to attorney requests to reissue its
opinion as a published opinion, noting:
This opinion was originally filed as a nonpublished
opinion on September 13, 2006. We received numerous
requests for publication that were well taken because
attorneys and trial courts in elder and dependent abuse
cases have struggled with the distinction between neglect
and professional negligence. The requests revealed that
attorneys and trial courts would benefit if we elaborated
on certain points in our prior, nonpublished opinion.
Rather than issue a piecemeal modification, we opted to
grant rehearing on our own motion under California
Rules of Court, rule 25(a), vacate the September 13, 2006
24
opinion, and issue a new and revised opinion.
The Sababin court’s acknowledgment of the difficulty of
parsing the delineation between professional negligence and elder
abuse highlights the key policy issue in holding health care
L.A. LAW. 42 (Oct. 2007). This article is, in part, an extension of Mr. Carney’s
search for the line, albeit from a plaintiff’s, rather than a nursing home defense,
perspective. While both plaintiffs and defendants may occasionally tactically
benefit from an ambiguous line, the bar, the health care industry, and even the
general public need to come to a general understanding of the difference between
negligent and abusive medical care.
18. 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 266 (Ct. App. 2006).
19. Id. at 268.
20. Delaney v. Baker, 971 P.2d 986 (Cal. 1999).
21. Sababin, 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 268.
22. Id.
23. CAL. RULES OF COURT, R. 8.1115(a).
24. Sababin, 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 268 n.5.
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professionals liable for elder or dependent abuse in egregious
cases: put simply, where is the line between negligent medical
25
malpractice and reckless elder abuse?
This article contends that California’s appellate publication
practices and the related prohibition on the citation of, or reliance
upon, unpublished opinions interfere with the rational process of
interpreting EADACPA to determine whether particular types of
behaviors by health care professionals constitute elder or
dependent adult abuse or neglect. Four areas of analysis are
necessary for understanding the impact of unpublished decisions
on California’s elder abuse law: first, the enactment of EADACPA
26
and the particulars of the Act; second, the California Supreme
Court’s interpretation of EADACPA in Delaney as it applies to
27
health care professionals; third, Delaney’s appellate progeny, both
published and unpublished, where the California appellate courts
have tried to implement Delaney’s distinction between professional
28
negligence and elder abuse; and finally, California’s appellate
publication rules, including their historical development and the
29
2007 revisions. The article concludes with the suggestion that the
California Supreme Court abandon its citation prohibition for
30
unpublished opinions.
II. ELDER ABUSE AND DEPENDENT ADULT CIVIL PROTECTION ACT
In 1975, the California Legislature enacted MICRA in response
to concern that medical malpractice awards were making it difficult
31
for physicians to afford malpractice insurance.
The MICRA
provisions include a hard cap for non-economic damages,
specifically that “[i]n any action for injury against a health care
provider based on professional negligence, the injured plaintiff
shall be entitled to recover non-economic losses to compensate for
pain, suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment, disfigurement
and other non-pecuniary damage” and that “[i]n no action shall
the amount of damages for non-economic losses exceed two

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

See Carney, supra note 17, at 42.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part V.
See infra Part VI.
Delaney v. Baker, 971 P.2d 986, 992 (Cal. 1999).
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32

hundred fifty thousand dollars ($250,000).” As an example of the
application of the MICRA cap, in 2002, a diabetic nursing home
resident was awarded $3 million by a jury for pain and suffering
after he underwent a bilateral amputation due to substandard
33
care. Despite the jury verdict, the court applied the MICRA cap
34
and reduced the judgment to $250,000.
In addition to the cap on non-economic damages, MICRA has
other provisions that curtail recovery against health providers.
35
MICRA restricts attorney fees and prohibits recovery for pain and
36
suffering once a patient dies. Another statute, Section 425.13 of
the California Code of Civil Procedure, also impedes meritorious
elder abuse actions by procedurally limiting punitive damage
awards by requiring that plaintiffs obtain a court order prior to
37
filing a claim for punitive damages. Plaintiffs must prove that
there is a substantial likelihood of prevailing prior to being allowed
38
to plead for punitive damages.
These remedy caps and procedural hurdles dampened the
39
willingness of attorneys to sue on behalf of elder abuse victims. In
32. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2(a)–(b) (West 1997).
33. Rustad, supra note 10, at 372 (citing Ollison v. Eskaton Homestead of Fair
Oaks, No. 00AS05801 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2002)).
34. Id.
35. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6146 (West 2008).
36. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 377.34 (West 2004); See also BRIAN BURWELL &
EILEEN TELL, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., THE NURSING HOME
LIABILITY INSURANCE MARKET: A CASE STUDY OF CALIFORNIA, 8 (June 2006),
http://aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/2006/NHliab-CA.pdf.
37. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.13(a) (West 2004); see, e.g., Aquino v. Superior
Court, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 477, 481 (Ct. App. 1993) (discussing the “procedure for
the trial court to determine whether punitive damages may be alleged against
health care providers in any action for damages arising out of alleged professional
negligence”).
38. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.13(a); see, e.g., Aquino, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 481
(noting section 425.13’s requirement that the plaintiff establish such a “substantial
likelihood”).
39. Hankin, supra note 11, at 19. Hankin states:
Talk about attorneys’ fees may seem meaningless since frail abused elders
and dependent adults often die before trial. Many a case failed when the
victim died before damages were awarded. Fearing an expensive loss of
time and money, attorneys usually declined to handle contingency cases
of obvious and severe abuse merely because the victim was rendered so
frail by the abuse that death might come before the damage award,
ending the hope of a truly significant recovery. Defendants have,
therefore, had every incentive to delay. No longer. Damages for pain and
suffering will be recoverable even after the victim’s death, up to
$250,000, if the plaintiff satisfies the tests for the recovery of attorneys’
fees. Contingency cases proving, by clear and convincing evidence, a
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1991, EADACPA was passed by the California Legislature in
response to lobbying by the Beverly Hills Bar Association and other
advocates regarding the poor treatment of elders in nursing
40
homes. The legislature made a number of critical findings as part
of the legislative process, findings that later proved instrumental in
41
interpreting the legislature’s intent in passing EADACPA.
Recognizing that elders may be “subjected to abuse, neglect, or
42
abandonment,” the legislature desired to direct the state’s
43
attention to this significant portion of the population.
In
addition, the legislature found that elders were vulnerable and
dependent upon families or caretakers, putting them at a greater
44
risk of abuse. Because of a hesitancy to take elder abuse cases
caused, in part, by statutory limitations on damages, the legislature
also saw a need “to enable interested persons to engage attorneys to
45
take up the cause,” providing an incentive to potential advocates.
Thus, the recoverable damages once restricted by MICRA became
46
possible through cases prosecuted under EADACPA.
The legislature made EADACPA broad enough to cover
situations where an individual over the age of eighteen is
47
vulnerable to abuse and neglect. The statute defines the term
“elder” as “any person residing in this state, 65 years of age or
48
older,” but it also extends protection to dependent adults—those
between the ages of eighteen and sixty-four with “physical or
mental limitations that restrict his or her ability to carry out normal
49
activities or to protect his or her rights.”
Within EADACPA,
“abuse of an elder or a dependent adult” is defined to specifically
cover physical and financial abuse, abandonment, isolation, and

reckless or intentional abuse of the frail are now viable.
Id.
40. Id. at 18–19; see also BURWELL & TELL, supra note 36, at 8 (noting that
EADACPA was enacted “following a series of studies on the quality of life for
California’s elderly.”).
41. See Delaney v. Baker, 971 P.2d 986, 991–92 (Cal. 1999).
42. CAL.WELF. & INST.CODE § 15600(a) (West 2001).
43. See id. § 15600(b).
44. Id. § 15600(d).
45. Id. § 15600(j).
46. See generally Martin Ramey, Comment, Putting the Cart Before the Horse: The
Need to Re-Examine Damage Caps in California’s Elder Abuse Act, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
599 (2002) (calling for the reform of EADAPCA damage caps).
47. CAL.WELF. & INST.CODE § 15600(c).
48. Id. § 15610.27.
49. Id. § 15610.23(a) (West Supp. 2010).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2010

7

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 1 [2010], Art. 4

2010]

UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS

213

50

abduction.
In more detail, physical abuse is defined with
references to the Penal Code’s definitions of assault, battery, sexual
assault, sexual battery, rape, incest, sodomy, and lewd or lascivious
51
acts. In addition to the listed crimes, physical abuse includes the
“[u]se of a physical or chemical restraint or psychotropic
medication” as a form of punishment, for a period beyond what the
physician or surgeon ordered, or using the medication without a
52
physician’s order.
EADACPA broadly defines neglect as a caregiver’s failure to
“exercise that degree of care that a reasonable person in a like
53
position would exercise.”
Neglect specifically includes: the
“failure to assist in personal hygiene, or in the provision of food,
54
clothing, or shelter”; the failure to provide medical or mental
55
health care; the “failure to protect elders from health and safety
56
hazards”;
and the “[f]ailure to prevent malnutrition or
57
dehydration.” The definition also addresses the need to protect
58
elders and dependent adults from self-neglect.
Section 15657 of the California Welfare and Institutions Code
is the key implementing section which expands the available
remedies in order to fulfill the legislature’s goal of enticing
attorneys to represent elders and dependent adults:
Where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence
that a defendant is liable for physical abuse as
defined in Section 15610.63 [or] neglect as defined
in Section 15610.57 . . . and that the defendant has
been guilty of recklessness, oppression, fraud, or
malice in the commission of this abuse, the following
shall apply, in addition to all other remedies
otherwise provided by law:

50. Id. § 15610.07 (West 2001). This article intentionally excludes from
analysis all forms of elder abuse except physical abuse and neglect. While
financial abuse is a significant problem in both California and the rest of the
United States, it is different in both kind and form from abuse and neglect
perpetrated by health care practitioners, with the possible exception of Medicaid
and Medicare fraud.
51. Id. § 15610.63 (West Supp. 2010).
52. Id. § 15610.63(f).
53. Id. § 15610.57 (West 2001).
54. Id. § 15610.57(b)(1).
55. Id. § 15610.57(b)(2).
56. Id. § 15610.57(b)(3).
57. Id. § 15610.57b)(4).
58. Id. § 15610.57(b)(5) (West Supp. 2010).
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(a) The court shall award to the plaintiff reasonable
attorney’s fees and costs. The term “costs” includes,
but is not limited to, reasonable fees for the services
of a conservator, if any, devoted to the litigation of a
claim brought under this article.
(b) The limitations imposed by Section 377.34 of the
Code of Civil Procedure on the damages recoverable
shall not apply. However, the damages recovered
shall not exceed the damages permitted to be
recovered pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section
3333.2 of the Civil Code.
(c) The standards set forth in subdivision (b) of
Section 3294 of the Civil Code regarding the
imposition of punitive damages on an employer
based upon the acts of an employee shall be satisfied
before any damages or attorney’s fees permitted
under this section may be imposed against an
59
employer.
Section 15657 requires that plaintiffs prove, by clear and
convincing evidence, that the defendant committed abuse or
neglect while acting in a reckless, oppressive, fraudulent, or
60
malicious manner. This heightened burden of proof was added
during the legislative process in response to opposition to
61
EADACPA from the California Association of Health Facilities. If
this burden is met, additional remedies are available, including
62
63
attorney fees and non-economic damages with a $250,000 cap.
Punitive damages are permitted if the plaintiff can show that the
defendant acted with oppression, fraud, or malice, or that a
59. Id. § 15657 (West 2001).
60. Id.
61. Delaney v. Baker, 971 P.2d 986, 994 (Cal. 1999).
62. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 15657.1. This section states:
The award of attorney’s fees pursuant to subdivision (a) of Section 15657
shall be based on all factors relevant to the value of the services rendered,
including, but not limited to, the factors set forth in Rule 4-200 of the
Rules of Professional Conduct of the State Bar of California, and all of
the following: (a) The value of the abuse-related litigation in terms of the
quality of life of the elder or dependent adult, and the results obtained.
(b) Whether the defendant took reasonable and timely steps to
determine the likelihood and extent of liability. (c) The reasonableness
and timeliness of any written offer in compromise made by a party to the
action.
Id.
63. Id. § 15657(b) (West Supp. 2010); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2(b) (West
1997).
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defendant employer employed an individual with “advance
knowledge of the unfitness of the employee and employed him or
her with conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others or
authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct for which the damages
64
are awarded.” On its face, section 15657.2 exempts health care
providers from liability for elder abuse and neglect for actions
defined as professional negligence:
Notwithstanding this article, any cause of action for injury
or damage against a health care provider, as defined in
Section 340.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, based on
the health care provider’s alleged professional negligence,
shall be governed by those laws which specifically apply to
65
those professional negligence causes of action.
Unfortunately, the legislature did not define “professional
negligence” within EADACPA, forcing courts to look back to
MICRA’s definition for guidance:
“Professional negligence” means a negligent act or
omission to act by a health care provider in the rendering
of professional services, which act or omission is the
proximate cause of a personal injury or wrongful death,
provided that such services are within the scope of services
for which the provider is licensed and which are not
within any restriction imposed by the licensing agency or
66
licensed hospital.
The legislature also failed to define “health care practitioner”
within EADACPA. This has made it somewhat unclear as to whom
the professional negligence exemption applies to under section
15657.2.
MICRA defines a “health care provider” as any person licensed
or certified pursuant to Division 2 of the Business and Professions
Code: licensed osteopaths or chiropractors, clinics, health
dispensaries and facilities, and “the legal representatives of a health
67
In contrast, EADACPA defines two different
care provider.”
groups having “care and custody” of elders and dependent adults:

64. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294.
65. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 15657.2.
66. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (West 1997). Not surprisingly, the same
definition for “professional negligence” is used in California Civil Procedure Code
section 364 and California Civil Procedure Code section 340.5. CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE §§ 340.5, 364 (West 2004).
67. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3333.1–3333.2.
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68

“health practitioner” and “care custodian.” “Health practitioner”
includes specific professions: “physician and surgeon, psychiatrist,
psychologist, dentist, resident, intern, podiatrist, chiropractor,
licensed nurse, dental hygienist, licensed clinical social worker or
associate clinical social worker, marriage, family, and child
counselor,” and also includes the same broadly inclusive clause as
MICRA: “or any other person who is currently licensed under
Division 2 (commencing with section 500) of the Business and
69
Professions Code.” Additionally, the definition includes medical
emergency technicians, paramedics, psychologist assistants,
marriage, family, and child counselor trainees, unlicensed
marriage, family, and child counselor interns, coroners, and state
or county public health or social service employees “who treat[] an
70
These
elder or a dependent adult for any condition.”
practitioners provide medical and related services to elders and
dependent adults.
In addition to medical care, elders and dependent adults often
receive varying degrees of care in day-to-day living tasks; EADACPA
defines those responsible for providing such care as “care
71
custodians.” The definition encompasses “an administrator or an
employee of any of the following public or private facilities or
agencies, or persons providing care or services for elders or
dependent adults, including members of the support staff and
72
maintenance staff.”
Twenty-four types of public and private
agencies are listed, including twenty-four-hour health facilities,
clinics, home-health agencies, day care resources, state social
services and county welfare departments, with an all-encompassing
final listing of “[a]ny other protective, public, sectarian, mental
health, or private assistance or advocacy agency or person
providing health services or social services to elders or dependent
73
adults.”

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 15610.37 (West Supp. 2010).
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id. § 15610.17.
Id.
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The legislature left the relationship between sections 15657
74
and 15657.2 unclear, perhaps intentionally. Specifically, it failed
to address the issue of whether professional negligence was defined
broadly enough to encompass all actions by a health care
provider—as suggested by the MICRA definition of professional
negligence—or whether there are certain behaviors that are
egregious enough that they go beyond professional negligence and
constitute abuse and neglect. Further, EADACPA is unclear on
whether all activities of a health care provider are considered
medical in nature or whether a health care provider can also be
independently responsible as a care custodian.
Judicial
interpretation, starting in Delaney v. Baker, has begun to answer
75
these questions.
III. DELANEY v. BAKER: HOLDING HEALTH CARE PRACTITIONERS
ACCOUNTABLE FOR ELDER AND DEPENDENT ADULT ABUSE
In Delaney v. Baker, the California Court of Appeal, First
District, affirmed a jury verdict in favor of Kay Delaney, a plaintiff
who sued the Meadowood Nursing Center and its administrators,
Calvin Baker, Sr. and Calvin Baker, Jr., for the wrongful death of
76
her mother. Kay Delaney’s mother, Rose Wallien, was a resident
77
of Meadowood for about four months. Ms. Wallien, an eightyeight-year-old, entered the Meadowood facility in April, 1993, in
78
order to receive skilled nursing care due to a broken ankle. On
August 9, 1993, she died from infection caused by Stage III and IV
pressure ulcers on her ankles, feet, and buttocks that she developed
79
while at Meadowood.
Her Stage IV pressure sores were deep
80
enough to expose bone. Based on the reckless neglect of Ms.
Wallien, the jury awarded the plaintiff damages for medical
74. See, e.g., Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 302 n.235 (2000)
(“When members of Congress focus on a particular issue but fail to reach a
collective decision about how to resolve it, they sometimes compromise by
enacting intentionally ambiguous language that transfers the issue to the courts.”).
75. See Delaney v. Baker, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 645, 645–46, 652 (Ct. App. 1997).
76. Id. at 646.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Delaney v. Baker, 971 P.2d 986, 988 (Cal. 1999).
80. See W. Andrew Arnold & Brian E. Arnold, Helping Society’s Most Vulnerable:
Nursing Home Litigation, 14 S.C. LAW. 29, 32 (Mar. 2003) (“Stage IV is a full skin
loss with extensive damage to the skin and underlying tissue, involving necrosis
(rotting of skin) and may cause damage to the muscle and bone.”). Stage III and
IV pressure ulcers are evidence of significant neglect. Delaney, 971 P.2d at 988.
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expenses, pain and suffering, and attorney’s fees and costs. The
defendants appealed to the California Court of Appeal, First
District, and then to the California Supreme Court.
The key issue in both appellate court opinions was whether
section 15657 of EADACPA was applicable to recklessly negligent
82
health care professionals despite the language of section 15657.2.
The First District Court of Appeal held that health professionals
could be held accountable under section 15657 despite the
83
language of section 15657.2.
It based its decision on the
definition of “specifically apply” in order to determine which
professional negligence laws MICRA limits apply to:
The question, however, is whether section 15657.2 states
that MICRA statutes shall solely govern or shall also govern.
Appellants answer that the Legislature intended that
MICRA alone should apply when the cause of action is
based on the health care provider’s alleged professional
negligence. Appellants’ argument implicitly assumes that
the application of MICRA or EADACPA is an either-or
proposition, but that both cannot apply in the same case.
We disagree with this assumption. Section 15657 solely
displaces statutes of general applicability, such as Code of
Civil Procedure section 377.34, which limits the damages
recoverable for a decedent’s injuries or death, and Code
of Civil Procedure section 1021, which limits the recovery
of attorney fees. EADACPA’s enhanced-remedy provisions
84
do not conflict with any specific provision of MICRA.
More importantly, the First District noted that EADACPA was a
remedial statute which should be interpreted liberally to preserve
the legislature’s intention to remedy some of the evils of elder
85
abuse and neglect. Thus, it concluded that its “interpretation of
section 15657.2 respects the legislature’s intent by leaving intact the
incentives created by EADACPA even where the cause of action is
‘based on the health care provider’s alleged professional
86
negligence.’”

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Delaney, 971 P.2d at 989.
Id .at 988.
Delaney v. Baker, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 645, 649 (Ct. App. 1997).
Id.
Id. at 650.
Id. (quoting CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 15657.2 (West 2010)).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2010

13

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 1 [2010], Art. 4

2010]

UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS

219

The First District’s decision in Delaney directly conflicted with
the Second District’s opinion in Mueller v. Saint Joseph Medical
87
Center, which held that EADACPA’s enhanced remedies in section
15657 were excluded by section 15657.2 when claims were based on
the rendition of professional services by health care providers, even
88
if the providers acted in a manner that was recklessly negligent.
The Mueller court based this holding on precedent defining the
89
term “based on” when it is used by the California Legislature. The
First District rejected this holding, noting that “[o]ur colleagues
reached this conclusion without analysis of section 15657.2 as a
whole or consideration of the legislative purposes of the statutory
90
scheme.”
Presumably because of the split in the districts, the
91
California Supreme Court granted the petition for review.
The California Supreme Court affirmed the First District’s
decision, but with different reasoning. Associate Justice Stanley
Mosk, the author of the supreme court opinion, noted that there
are three distinct ways to view the relationship between sections
15657 and 15657.2: first, following the court of appeal’s approach
92
and interpreting away any conflict between the sections; second,
following the defendant’s proposed approach, which would
“broadly exempt from the heightened remedies of section 15657
health care providers who recklessly neglect elder and dependent
93
adults”; and finally, the approach of “the amici curiae Consumer
Attorneys of California (joined to some degree by California
94
Advocates for Nursing Home Reform, Inc.).” The court adopted
the third approach, but Associate Justice Janice Rogers Brown
concurred in the result because she preferred the argument of the
95
court of appeal.
87. Mueller v. Saint Joseph Med. Ctr., 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d 668 (Ct. App. 1997).
88. Id. at 670–71.
89. Id. at 670–72.
90. Delaney, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 652.
91. See Delaney v. Baker, 951 P.2d 1183 (Cal. 1998).
92. According to Associate Justice Mosk:
[S]ection 15657 is not thereby limited because section 15657.2 requires
only that causes of action based on professional negligence be governed
by laws that specifically apply to professional negligence actions, in
particular the package of legislation referred to as the MICRA, and the
statutes that are limited by section 15657 do not “specifically apply” to
professional negligence actions.
Delaney v. Baker, 971 P.2d 986, 989 (Cal. 1999).
93. Id. at 990.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 998.
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Although the supreme court generally accepted the court of
appeal’s reliance on the remedial nature of EADACPA, it rejected
the court of appeal’s reliance on the definition of “specifically
apply” and opted instead to define “based on professional
negligence” much more narrowly than the defendants and the
96
Mueller court. It held that “reckless neglect” under section 15657
is distinct from causes of action “based on professional negligence”
97
within the meaning of section 15657.2. Consequently, health care
providers who engage in reckless neglect are acting beyond
professional negligence and are thus subject to section 15657’s
98
enhanced remedies. The court explained:
The legislative history shows that the Court of Appeal’s
interpretation is not plausible; rather it indicates that
those who enacted the statute thought that the term
“professional negligence,” at least within the meaning of
section 15657.2, was mutually exclusive of the abuse and
neglect specified in section 15657. This is seen most
clearly in the Legislative Counsel’s Digest to the 1991
amendments to the Elder Abuse Act, which included
section 15657 and 15657.2. The digest describes section
15657.2 as follows: “This bill would also specify that
actions against health care professionals for professional
negligence shall be governed by laws specifically
applicable to professional negligence actions, rather than
99
by these provisions.”
Thus, the court held that “[i]n order to obtain the remedies
available in section 15657, a plaintiff must demonstrate by clear
and convincing evidence that defendant is guilty of something
more than negligence; he or she must show reckless, oppressive,
100
fraudulent, or malicious conduct.”
This conduct is expressly distinguished from professional
negligence. The court explained that oppressive, fraudulent, or
malicious conduct involves “‘intentional,’ ‘willful,’ or ‘conscious’
101
wrongdoing of a ‘despicable’ or ‘injurious’ nature.”
In contrast
to negligence, the court noted that recklessness “involves more

96. See id. at 997.
97. Id. at 998.
98. Id. at 997.
99. Id. at 990 (internal citations omitted) (quoting LEGIS. COUNSEL’S DIG.,
S.B. No. 679, Reg. Sess., at 1 (Cal. 1991–1992)).
100. Id. at 991.
101. Id. (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294).
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than ‘inadvertence, incompetence, unskillfulness, or a failure to
take precautions’ but rather rises to the level of a ‘conscious choice
of a course of action . . . with knowledge of the serious danger to
102
others involved in it.’”
Delaney’s general proposition, that the enhanced remedies of
section 15657 are only available in cases of “reckless, oppressive,
fraudulent, or malicious conduct” committed against an elder or
dependent adult, is clear enough on the surface, but difficult to
parse against the facts in medical abuse cases. Bryan Carney, a
California nursing home defense lawyer, explains:
Delaney’s articulation of recklessness is a helpful but not
definitive yardstick for distinguishing between elder abuse
and professional negligence. Its facts are deplorable, but
not many cases lie at that end of the spectrum. Most cases
fall somewhere in the middle, and Delaney does not
indicate what facts are needed, either at the pleading or
summary judgment stage, for a case to cross the line
separating elder abuse from professional negligence.
That middle ground is being defined by the courts of
appeal. With increasing frequency, inquiries concerning
“What did they know?” and “When did they know it?” are
being used to draw the line between professional
103
negligence and elder abuse.
The need for ample guidance from the appellate courts
fleshing out the contours of the difference between professional
negligence and reckless elder abuse is evident. Unfortunately, as
shown below in Parts IV and V, the decision whether to publish,
partially publish, or even depublish relevant opinions pursuant to
the California’s appellate publication rule interferes with this
process and the evolution of the law. Even in Delaney, the court of
appeal partially published their decision, attempting to explain:
In the published portion of our opinion, we reject
appellants’ interpretation of EADACPA; in the
unpublished portion of this decision, we agree with
appellants’ contention that the special damages award was
not supported by substantial evidence and we reject
appellants’ argument that the Bakers should not be held
liable personally. In sum, we affirm in part and reverse in
104
part.
102.
103.
104.

Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 cmt. g (1965)).
Carney, supra note 17, at 44–45.
Delaney v. Baker, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 645, 646 (Ct. App. 1997).
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Without access to the physical court file, it is impossible for
researchers to gain access to parts II.A.4, II.B, and II.C of the
opinion, thus rendering silent part of the foundation for one the
most important national cases applying elder abuse standards to
health practitioners.
IV. DELANEY’S PROGENY
The opinions—both published and unpublished—that cite
Delaney as authority constitute the universe of potential precedent
governing the question of whether a particular failure by a health
care provider constitutes abuse and neglect or professional
105
negligence.
As of June 2010 there are 117 published and
unpublished case opinions and orders that cite Delaney. Because of
the variation between the two primary citators, Shepard’s on
106
LexisNexis, and KeyCite on Westlaw, this analysis constitutes a
conglomeration of the data provided by both citators. Of the 117
citations on KeyCite and Shepard’s, twenty-one are orders from the
California Superior Courts included in Westlaw, but not
107
LexisNexis. These orders are excluded from this analysis as they
clearly are not precedent, except for the parties involved in the
litigation, leaving ninety-six opinions that cite Delaney, including
seven federal district court opinions, two of which are published.
These opinions are examined in detail below, organized by court.
A. California Supreme Court
The California Supreme Court has cited Delaney nine times,
with two of the nine opinions addressing issues relating to
108
professional negligence and elder abuse. The earlier of these two
105. A search of both annotated statutes as well as an independent search in
Westlaw using 15657 and 15657.2, the relevant statutory section numbers, revealed
no additional cases that cited Delaney that were not already in the list.
106. See William L. Taylor, Comparing KeyCite and Shepard’s for Completeness,
Currency, and Accuracy, 92 LAW LIBR. J. 127 (2002).
107. KeyCite’s inclusion of trial court orders alongside published and
unpublished opinions is confusing and misleading, as the trial court orders do not
constitute precedent for future cases. Thomson Reuters should include orders as
a separate category, such as law reviews, rather than including them as equivalents
to appellate opinions.
108. The seven irrelevant opinions are: Cacho v. Boudreau, 149 P.3d 473 (Cal.
2007); People v. Canty, 90 P.3d 1168 (Cal. 2004); Kahn v. E. Side Union High Sch.
Dist., 75 P.3d 30 (Cal. 2003); People v. Seneca Ins. Co., 62 P.3d 81 (Cal. 2003);
Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co. v. Reiswig, 980 P.2d 895 (Cal. 1999); People v. Birkett,
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109

opinions, Mueller v. Saint Joseph Medical Center,
was
contemporaneous with Delaney in the courts of appeal, and came to
110
the opposite conclusion.
As discussed in Part II, the California
Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeal, Second District’s
decision and remanded the case with instructions to reconsider the
case in light of Delaney. The second decision, Covenant Care, Inc. v.
111
Superior Court, is tangential to Delaney’s holding but is instructive
112
regarding the court’s interpretation of EADACPA.
In Covenant Care, Inc., the plaintiffs, adult children of an
elderly decedent named Juan Inclan, alleged that the defendant
nursing home corporation “conspired and otherwise ‘acted with
malice and oppression’ in moving and treating decedent in order
to maximize revenue from the Medicare and Medicaid programs
and to avoid regulatory penalties for noncompliance with certain
113
federal and state regulations.” They further alleged:
While decedent was at defendants’ nursing facility . . .
defendants knew he was suffering from Parkinson’s
disease and was unable to care for his personal needs.
Defendants nevertheless failed to provide decedent with
proper care, nutrition, hydration, and medication.
Defendants’ conduct was in conscious disregard of
decedent’s rights and safety. Decedent was left in his bed,
unattended and unassisted, for excessively long periods.
Although decedent increasingly could not feed or hydrate
himself, he was for long periods not provided assistance
with these activities. As a result, decedent was
inadequately stimulated, became malnourished, and lost
much of his body weight. Decedent was left in his
excrement for long periods; he developed ulcers on his
body that exposed muscle and bone and became septic;
and he also became severely dehydrated. As decedent
deteriorated, he manifested signs and symptoms of
114
starvation, dehydration, neglect, and abuse.

980 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1999); and Barris v. County of Los Angeles, 972 P.2d 966 (Cal.
1999).
109. 977 P.2d 66 (Cal. 1999).
110. See Delaney v. Baker, 69 Cal. Rptr.2d 645, 652 (Ct. App. 1997).
111. 86 P.3d 290 (Cal. 2004).
112. Id. at 295.
113. Id. at 292.
114. Id. at 292–93.
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The supreme court granted review to resolve a conflict in the
courts of appeal regarding the applicability of Section 425.13(a) of
the California Code of Civil Procedure, which imposes procedural
roadblocks on plaintiffs seeking punitive damages arising out of the
professional negligence of a health care provider, to EADACPA.
The court held that section 425.13(a) procedures do not apply in
cases where health professionals commit elder abuse or neglect,
noting that nothing in the text, legislative history, or purposes of
either section 425.13(a) or EADACPA suggest that the “Legislature
intended to afford health care providers that act as elder
custodians, and that egregiously abuse the elders in their custody,
the special protections against exemplary damages they enjoy when
115
accused of negligence in providing health care.”
The court
noted that elder abuse committed by a health care provider is not
an action that is “directly related” to the provider’s professional
services and that “a failure to fulfill custodial duties owed by a
custodian who happens also to be a health care provider, such
abuse is at most incidentally related to the provider’s professional
116
health care services.”
Practically, Covenant Care, Inc. notes that some health care
institutions perform both custodial functions and professional
medical care and the fact that health care professionals do both
interrelated functions does not convert all activities into
117
professional medical care subject to various tort reform statutes.
Thus, the court applied Delaney’s reasoning to again distinguish
professional negligence both from egregious abuse committed by
health care professionals, and from custodial functions conducted
by health care institutions and their professional employees.
B. Court of Appeal, First District
The Court of Appeal, First District, has seventeen opinions
that cite Delaney as authority for various propositions of law, but
only four of the opinions, all unpublished, examine the differences
118
between professional negligence and elder abuse.
One of the
115. Id. at 292.
116. Id. at 298–99.
117. Id. at 299.
118. Two of the otherwise irrelevant thirteen decisions are published opinions
that examine other aspects of EADACPA in detail. They are: Fitzhugh v. Granada
Healthcare & Rehab. Ctr., LLC, 58 Cal. Rptr. 3d 585, 589 (Ct. App. 2007) (holding
that in wrongful death and Patient Bill of Rights suit, applying arbitration clause to
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two more substantive of these opinions is Leong v. Woods, where
the court of appeal reversed the trial court’s order of summary
judgment against the plaintiff in an action for elder abuse and the
120
wrongful death of his mother, Susan Leong.
Ms. Leong was a
seventy-eight year-old diabetic with extensive cardiovascular disease
121
who had fallen and broken a hip.
While recovering in the
hospital from surgery, she developed Stage II heel ulcers and was
transferred to the Ygnacio Valley Care Center where the defendant,
122
Dr. James Woods, was the attending physician.
The defendant
admitted that he had probably not removed her bandages to check
123
Then, he
her heels upon her admission on January 10, 2002.
124
then went on vacation until February 1, 2002. He again did not
check her ulcers on February 4, 2002, when a nurse told him that
125
Plaintiff’s expert witness, Dr. Kathryn
they had not healed.
Locatell, testified:
Woods’s care of Leong while her attending physician “fell
below the standard of care, was gross neglect, and was
reckless. A patient in a skilled nursing facility simply
should not have Stage II heel blisters advance to open,

survivors of elder would “minimize the Legislature’s expression of public policy
that under no circumstances may a patient or resident waive his or her right to sue
for violations of rights under the Patients Bill of Rights, or other federal and state
laws and regulations, which would include the existing Elder Abuse and
Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act.”); and Easton v. Sutter Coast Hosp., 95 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 316 (Ct. App. 2000) (suit against doctor and nurse by children of
deceased elder for reporting suspected elder abuse and neglect dismissed because
mandatory reporting statute provides absolute, rather than qualified, immunity
from suit). The remaining irrelevant opinions are: In re Estate of Kloor, Nos.
A117181, A117207, 2009 WL 2952224 (Cal. Ct. App. Sep 15, 2009); Clark v. Clark,
No. A11811, 2009 WL 1863897 (Cal. Ct. App. June 29, 2009); Fernandez v. Beaton,
No. A118592, 2009 WL 1588055 (Cal. Ct. App. June 8, 2009); Jay v. Kubly, No.
A117103, 2008 WL 77572 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan 8, 2008); Cohen v. Five Brooks Stable,
72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 471 (Ct. App. 2008); Feaster v. Wynn, No. A105792, 2007 WL
1649414 (Cal. Ct. App. June 7, 2007); Trigueros v. Transamerica Corp., No.
A108936, 2006 WL 2724034 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 25, 2006); Megrabian v. Saenz, 30
Cal. Rptr. 3d 262 (Ct. App. 2005); Feied v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No.
A102968, 2004 WL 378186 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 2, 2004); Moon v. Guardian
Postacute Servs., Inc., 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d 218 (Ct. App. 2002); and Kavanaugh v. W.
Sonoma Cnty. Union High Sch. Dist., 111 Cal. Rptr. 2d 829 (Ct. App. 2001).
119. No. A108730, 2006 WL 52260 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 10, 2006).
120. Id. at *1.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at *2.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol37/iss1/4

20

Mead: Unpublished Opinions and Citation Prohibitions: Judicial Muddling

226

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:1

infected Stage IV ulcers within eight weeks and should not
go from being ‘well-nourished’ to being ‘significantly
malnourished’ within six weeks. Proper monitoring and
caring for patients prevent this type of progression of
126
these conditions.”
Locatell noted that Woods failed to adequately assess Leong’s
heels and her nutritional requirements during her stay at Ynacio
127
Valley Care Center. Locatell stated:
From the time of her admission (January 10, 2002) until
the date he transferred the patient for surgical
intervention of the infected ulcers (March 5, 200[2]),
there is no evidence that he examined the wounds on any
specific date. Mrs. Leong’s heel ulcers continued to
progress and her nutritional status continued to decline
throughout the time Dr. Woods was her attending
physician. Dr. Woods’s failure to properly diagnose the
condition of the wounds and Mrs. Leong’s malnutrition in
a timely manner led to his failure to issue appropriate
128
orders for her care.
The court held that:
The question is whether Woods’s failure to ensure that
others complied with his orders and his failure to notice
or make sure that Leong’s weight was being taken
regularly demonstrated a “‘deliberate disregard’ of the
‘high degree of probability’ that an injury will occur’” or
made a “‘conscious choice of a course of action . . . with
knowledge of the serious danger to others involved in it.’”
Woods’s testimony that he could not recall whether he
reviewed Leong’s chart to determine whether his orders
concerning care for her heel wounds were followed and
his testimony that he normally did not check to see if his
orders had been followed does evince a callous
129
disregard.

126. Id. at *5.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at *16 (quoting Delaney v. Baker, 971 P.2d 986, 991 (Cal. 1999))
(citation omitted).
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In contrast to Leong, in Trengali v. Northern California
130
the Court of Appeal, First District,
Presbyterian Homes, Inc.,
affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of an elder abuse claim against
the nursing staff at The Sequoias, a residential facility for the
131
elderly where Helen Steffan spent seventeen years of her life. Ms.
Steffen was suffering from extreme pain, swelling, and abdominal
132
cramps over a period of five weeks.
One of Ms. Steffen’s
daughters stopped a doctor on his rounds and asked him to help
133
her mother. He replied “he could not do anything because there
134
A month later, another
was nothing wrong with Ms. Steffen.”
daughter took her to the emergency room where they intubated
135
400cc’s of gastric and fecal matter through a tube in her nose.
136
The hospital found an ileocecal tumor had blocked her bowel.
After a month of care in the hospital, Ms. Steffen was discharged to
137
another nursing home, where she died three months later. Her
heirs brought suit against the nursing home’s staff for failing to
“inform the attending physicians of Ms. Steffen’s true medical
status” resulting in a “denied . . . opportunity to be properly
138
diagnosed and to receive medical care in the first instance.” Ms.
Steffen’s heirs argued that earlier detection of the tumor would
139
have improved her quality of life during her last year. The Court
of Appeal, First District, rejected the elder abuse claim, explaining:
In contrast to these cases illustrating egregious abuse of
the elderly, this case involves an allegation that members
of the nursing staff at The Sequoias were remiss in not
reporting sufficient information to the physicians so that

130. No. A094106, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 4742 (Ct. App. Jan. 18,
2002). Somewhat surprisingly, this case is not included in Westlaw’s California
case database. If appellate courts release unpublished opinions to Thomson
Reuters and LexisNexis for de facto publication in the two big legal research
services, it is imperative that everyone involved in the process ensures that the
databases are complete and correct. “Old-fashioned” publication in print
reporters gives the publishers ample opportunity to check for error, including
missing opinions. Digital publication needs to be conducted with the same degree
of care.
131. Id. at *3.
132. Id. at *4.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at *5.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at *5–6.
139. Id. at *9.
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the cause of Ms. Steffen’s abdominal distress could be
more rapidly diagnosed. Significantly, there has been no
showing in this case that the nursing staff ignored Ms.
Steffen’s medical condition, deprive [sic] her of needed
care in any significant sense, or displayed an intention of
harming her by withholding treatment. Instead, the
undisputed evidence demonstrates rather conclusively
that the nursing staff was not fully aware of the
significance of some of the warning signs of intestinal
blockage displayed by Ms. Steffen and may have been
remiss in not communicating more effectively with her
physicians. In sum, the proof falls far short of supporting
a finding that the nursing staff acted with recklessness,
oppression, fraud or malice in providing medical care to
Ms. Steffen.
Appellants attempt to promote their claim of negligence
to one of recklessness by dressing it up with bits and
pieces of the deposition testimony of three of Ms.
Steffen’s treating physicians. When questioned, the
physicians indicated they had no independent
recollection of certain conversations with the nursing staff
or medical record entries with respect the treatment
provided Ms. Steffen several years earlier. Appellants
argue: “The discrepancies in [the head nurse’s] testimony
and that of the physicians and the irregularities in the
medical records give rise to a strong inference that the
medical records were falsified, an act of recklessness in
itself.” To allow the jury to find the type of wrongful
conduct necessary to qualify for the heightened remedies
under the Elder Abuse Act from these facts, however,
would be to sanction an impermissible degree of
speculation. The fact the physicians could not remember
these events is not surprising given the amount of time
that had passed. Appellants have failed to show that there
is a triable issue of fact as to their claims under the Elder
140
Abuse Act.
While somewhat harsh in tone, especially given the horrific
medical facts, Trengali clearly stands for the position that finding
recklessness requires more than a showing of poor medical
outcomes and questionable record keeping. It also illuminates a
key tension in nursing home litigation, the inherent conflict
between negligent nursing staff and attending, off-site physicians
140.

Id. at *16–18.
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141

who make occasional rounds.
The other two relevant Court of Appeal, First District, opinions
contrasting professional negligence and elder abuse are also
unpublished, but are less instructive regarding the difference
between professional negligence and elder abuse. In Marasovic v.
142
Alta Bates Medical Center, the court of appeal sustained a demurrer
in which the trial court rejected an argument that a hospital and
hospital social worker committed elder abuse when they caused
Elizabeth Marasovic to be “admitted to a nursing home against her
will, knowing that the nursing home in question (ShieldsRichmond) did not honor do not resuscitate (DNR) orders and
143
had unsafe conditions.”
The plaintiff, the decedent’s daughter,
failed to prove that this allegation constituted professional
144
negligence. The court of appeal reasoned that “[i]f respondents’
treatment of Elizabeth was not negligent, then a fortiori it did not
145
involve intentional, willful, or reckless misconduct.”
146
Similarly, in Mooradian v. Convalescent Center Mission Street, the
Court of Appeal, First District, affirmed summary judgment against
the plaintiff in a case where an elderly resident with significant
cognitive and physical maladies died from a stroke brought on by a
147
brain injury caused by an unobserved fall.
The court held that
148
the plaintiff “failed to present evidence of any conduct” of the
facility, intentional or otherwise, that inflicted head trauma on
decedent:
Because appellant cannot show a triable issue of material
fact that Center acted negligently, it is clear that appellant
cannot meet the higher burden, required under the Elder
Abuse Act, of showing, by clear and convincing evidence,
that Center acted recklessly, or is guilty of oppression,
fraud, or malice. . . . Center’s reckless neglect cannot be
inferred simply because decedent suffered a serious
141. See Marshall B. Kapp, The Liability Environment for Physicians Providing
Nursing Home Medical Care: Does It Make a Difference for Residents?, 16 ELDER L. J. 249,
270–71 (2009) (describing legal anxiety experienced by nursing home physicians
when they must rely upon nursing staff for information and execution of
treatment).
142. No. A106355, 2006 WL 367350 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 17, 2006).
143. Id. at *7.
144. Id. at *2.
145. Id. at *8.
146. No. A122009, 2009 WL 1863896 (Cal. Ct. App. June 29, 2009).
147. Id. at *1.
148. Id. at *7.
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injury. We conclude that the trial court did not err in
granting summary judgment against appellant’s elder
149
abuse claim.
Marasovic and Mooradian demonstrate that, where the trial
court finds the evidence insufficient to prove professional
negligence, the Court of Appeal, First District, will summarily
affirm a trial court’s rejection of any elder abuse or neglect claim,
and the opinion will likely be unpublished.
C. Court of Appeal, Second District
The Court of Appeal, Second District, has by far the greatest
number of citations to Delaney of any of the courts of appeal. Of
the thirty-two citations, sixteen are irrelevant to the issue of
professional negligence and elder abuse by health care
150
practitioners. Of the remaining opinions, five are published, and
the remaining eleven are unpublished. Two of the published cases
151
have been discussed above. As noted in the introduction, Sababin
152
v. Superior Court
highlights the bar’s desire to have an
153
In
unpublished elder abuse case reconsidered for publication.
Sababin, the court reversed summary adjudication on behalf of the
defendants, holding:
[I]t is reasonably deducible that Covina’s employees
neglected to follow the care plan by failing to check
149. Id.
150. The irrelevant opinions are: Andrews v. Superior Court, No. B219388,
2010 WL 1694468 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 28, 2010); Lewis v. Good Samaritan Hosp.,
No. B199966, 2008 WL 4076000 (Cal. Ct. App. Sep. 04, 2008); Sanders v. Lawson,
78 Cal. Rptr. 3d 851 (Ct. App. 2008); DeWalsche v. Genis, No. B183044, 2006 WL
3804521 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2006); McCray v. Garcia, No. B179477, 2006 WL
1900873 (Cal. Ct. App. July 12, 2006); Pitluck v. Beverly Enter., Inc., No. B179680,
2005 WL 3008579 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 10, 2005); In re Conservatorship of Kayle, 35
Cal. Rptr. 3d 671 (2005); Gonzales v. Whittier Hosp. Medic. Center, No. B175273,
2005 WL 2360080 (Cal. Ct. App. Sep. 27, 2005); Gonzales v. Nasser-Moaddeli, No.
B176152, 2005 WL 1970955 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 17, 2005); In re Estate of Lowrie,
12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 828 (Ct. App. 2004); Sandore v. State Farm Gen. Ins. Co., No.
B157766, 2003 WL 1950252 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 25, 2003); Johnson v. Superior
Court, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 650 (Ct. App. 2002); Conservatorship of Pers. and Estate
of Marion Adams v. Butler, No. B143700, 2002 WL 111356 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 29,
2002); California Amplifier, Inc. v. RLI Ins. Co., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 915 (Ct. App.
2001); Hellinger v. Farmers Group, Inc., 111 Cal. Rptr. 2d 268, 91 Cal. App. 4th
1049 (2001); and Perry v. Shaw, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 70 (Ct. App. 2001).
151. See supra Part I.
152. 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 266 (Ct. App. 2006).
153. See Sababin v. Superior Court, No. B190060, 2006 WL 2615418 (Cal. Ct.
App. Sept. 13, 2006).
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Renteria’s skin condition on a daily basis and failing to
notify a physician of the need for a treatment order.
Thus, there is a triable issue as to whether Covina’s
employee’s conduct was neglect under section 15610.57
because they failed to provide Renteria with medical care
for physical needs and to protect her from health and
safety hazards.
Moreover, when the evidence and
inferences are liberally construed, we easily conclude that
there is a triable issue as to whether Covina’s employees
acted with recklessness, oppression or malice. A trier of
fact could find that when a care facility’s employees
ignore a care plan and fail to check the skin condition of
a resident with Huntington’s Chorea, such conduct shows
deliberate disregard of the high degree of probability that
154
she will suffer injury.
Since the defendant’s failure to follow a resident’s treatment
155
plan can constitute elder abuse and neglect under EADACPA, it
is clear why the plaintiff’s bar wanted Sababin published. It
arguably expands the definition of recklessness to a pattern of
“repeated withholding of care” which “leads to the conclusion that
156
the pattern was the result of choice or deliberate indifference.” A
pattern and practice of neglectful behaviors is one of the key
factual findings in Sababin about abusive behavior by health care
professionals as it evinces an on-going disregard of the patient’s
157
well-being.
The other previously discussed published opinion is Covenant
158
Care, Inc. v. Superior Court, which was affirmed by the supreme
court and discussed under the supreme court heading in this
159
part.
The remaining three published opinions from the Court of
Appeal, Second District, that cite Delaney address tangential issues
that illuminate the difference between professional negligence and
elder abuse and neglect committed by health care professionals. In
160
Country Villa Claremont Healthcare Center, Inc. v. Superior Court, over
a period of fourteen months, Ms. Ernestina Rodriguez, a seventysix-year-old nursing home resident with Parkinson’s disease,
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Sababin, 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 272–73.
See id.
Id. at 273.
See id.
107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 291 (Ct. App. 2001).
See supra Part IV.A.
15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 315 (Ct. App. 2004).
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161

suffered extensively due to poor care.
She rarely received the
162
She developed
pain reliever prescribed by her physician.
pressure ulcers on both heels which resulted in amputation of her
163
left leg due to gangrene.
After the surgery, when she was
admitted to Country Villa Claremont Healthcare Center, the ulcer
on her right heel worsened and she was often left in filthy and
164
unsanitary conditions.
She eventually died of aspirational
pneumonia “as a result of Country Villa’s failure to provide her
with the proper diet of puree food, monitor her food intake, and
165
assist with her eating.”
Her heirs sued pursuant to EADACPA,
166
The court of appeal,
including a claim for punitive damages.
relying on Covenant Care, Inc., held that Section 425.13 of the
California Code of Civil Procedure inapplicable in elder abuse
167
actions, and thus would not bar punitive damages.
168
Benun v. Superior Court
also applied the analysis from
Covenant Care, Inc., when it held that the three year statute of
limitations for professional negligence does not apply to actions
169
under EADACPA. The court explained:
Thus, Delaney makes clear that a cause of action for
custodial elder abuse against a health care provider is a
separate and distinct cause of action from one for
professional negligence against a health care provider. It
follows that egregious acts of elder abuse are not
governed by laws applicable to negligence. Specifically,
section 15657.2 was enacted “to make sufficiently clear
that ‘professional negligence’ was to be beyond the scope
of section 15657.” Section 15657.2 specifies that actions
for professional negligence as defined in section 340.5 are
governed by laws specifically applicable to actions for
professional negligence (e.g., § 340.5), so it would seem to
follow that section 340.5 has no application to actions
170
brought under section 15657.
Consequently, the court of appeal reversed the trial court,
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id. at 317.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 317–18.
Id. at 318.
Id. at 318.
Id. at 322.
20 Cal. Rptr. 3d 26 (Ct. App. 2004).
Id. at 35–37.
Id. at 34 (quotation omitted).
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which had applied the three-year statute of limitations on the
premise that the facts in the case showed professional negligence
171
rather than elder abuse.
172
Most recently, in Perlin v. Fountain View Management, Inc., a
partially published opinion, the Court of Appeal, Second District,
addressed the question whether Section 15657 of EADACPA’s clear
and convincing standard for recovery of attorney fees applied to
173
Ms. Helen Perlin
both causation and liability or just liability.
developed a leg wound due to inappropriate use of a continuous
174
passive motion machine after she had a knee replaced. She died
a month later of pneumonia while still in the hospital for her leg
175
wound. The jury found the defendants guilty of elder abuse and
awarded the plaintiffs $300,000, which was remitted to $250,000
176
Plaintiffs
plus pre-judgment interest pursuant to section 15657.
moved for $781,945.25 in attorney’s fees, arguing that they were
entitled to such fees because:
[T]he jury found by clear and convincing evidence that
one or more of Summit Care’s employees acted recklessly
in the medical or custodial care of Perlin, and the parties
had stipulated that Summit Care ratified the acts and
omissions of its employees. The jury found causation
under a preponderance of the evidence standard, but was
unable to reach a verdict for causation under the clear
177
and convincing evidence standard.
The Court of Appeal, Second District, affirmed the denial of
the fees motion as the plaintiffs had failed to prove causation of Ms.
178
The plaintiffs
Perlin’s injury by clear and convincing evidence.
argued that elder abuse actions were not independent actions, but
only grounds for additional remedies that rested upon a base of
negligence, which only require a preponderance of the evidence to
179
establish causation. The court of appeal rejected this argument,
holding that EADACPA creates an independent cause of action for
180
elder abuse.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id. at 29–30.
77 Cal. Rptr. 3d 743 (Ct. App. 2008).
Id. at 746–51.
Id. at 745.
Id. at 746.
Id. at 745.
Id. at 747.
Id. at 750.
See id. at 748–49.
Id. at 749–50.; see also Sande L. Buhai & James W. Gilliam, Jr., Honor Thy
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The remaining ten unpublished opinions, not including the
unpublished version of Sababin discussed above, are split regarding
whether the reviewing court of appeal found elder abuse,
professional neglect, or neither on the part of the defendant health
care provider. In four of the ten cases, the evidence of elder abuse
committed by health care practitioners was found sufficient to state
a claim or sustain a judgment.
181
In Hubbard v. Zargarian,
the Court of Appeal, Second
District, made an important distinction between elder abuse and
neglect committed by the staff of a hospital as opposed to possible
182
professional negligence, committed by a treating physician.
Ms.
Hattie Southall, an eighty-two-year-old, was admitted for a
183
myocardial infarction.
During her sixteen-day stay in the
hospital, she had developed a gangrenous foot and serious
184
decubitus ulcers.
The court of appeal reversed the trial court’s
grant of demurrer on the pleading in favor of the hospital, holding
the “allegations show a deliberate disregard of the high degree of
probability Southall would suffer severe pressure ulcers/gangrene
and are sufficient to assert a cause of action for elder abuse based
185
Interestingly, the court of appeal affirmed
on reckless neglect.”
the demurrer of the elder abuse claim against the treating
physician for failing to ensure that the nurses carried out a skin
186
integrity plan. It noted:
There are no fact allegations that Dr. Zargarian provided
custodial care or was responsible for supervising the
nurses at SFMC and appellant cites no legal authority
imposing such a duty on a cardiologist. At best, the other
allegations against Dr. Zargarian reflect professional
187
negligence, i.e., the lack of the use of reasonable care.
Citing Covenant Care, Inc., the court of appeal distinguished
between the custodial care responsibilities and the medical care
conducted by the treating physician, dismissing the importance of

Mother and Father: Preventing Elder Abuse Through Education and Litigation 36 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 565, 572–73 (2003) (analyzing the conflict regarding whether
EADACPA creates a separate cause of action).
181. No. B207427, 2009 WL 4043507 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 24, 2009).
182. See id. at *3.
183. Id. at *1.
184. Id.
185. Id. at *7.
186. Id.
187. Id.
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188

the physician’s skin care plan because he was a cardiologist.
189
In Camacho v. Meridian Neurocare, the Court of Appeal,
Second District, affirmed a judgment against a nursing home for
190
wrongful death and elder abuse.
The nursing staff failed to
adequately treat and record the decedent’s fever, infection, and
pressure sores and used “canned” comments on the care charts that
191
did not reflect actual treatment. As a result of these actions, the
192
The court of appeal, relying on
decedent rapidly lost weight.
Delaney, found that there was sufficient evidence of egregious
193
neglect to warrant a judgment of elder abuse and neglect.
194
In Gibson v. Superior Court, the court of appeal vacated the
trial court’s demurrer, and found that an estate’s complaint alleged
sufficient facts to initiate a claim under EADACPA for elder abuse
195
which resulted in the wrongful death of Ms. Thelma Gibson. Ms.
196
Gibson, suffering from dementia, was in a skilled nursing facility
recovering from a hip replacement when she suffered another
broken hip because she tried to get out of her wheelchair when no
197
assistant was nearby. The court of appeal observed:
Among other things, the estate’s complaint alleges (1) the
defendants were aware that Gibson needed “Full
Assist[ance] . . . for eating, transferring, and ambulating”;
(2) Gibson was unsupervised by any nurse at the time of
the fall that is the subject of the elder abuse claim; (3) the
nursing facility consciously failed to provide a geri-chair
with a tray to restrain Gibson from getting up unassisted;
(4) the nursing facility consciously failed to provide
sufficient budget and staffing to meet patient needs; and
(5) the facility had received several deficiency notices
relating to the risks of patients falling. Together, these
facts were sufficient to withstand a demurrer to the elder
198
abuse claim.

188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

Id. at *3.
No. B178473, 2006 WL 1391223 (Cal. Ct. App. May 23, 2006).
Id. at *1.
Id. at *3.
Id. at *7.
See id. at *6–11.
No. B192421, 2006 WL 2865652 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 10, 2006).
Id. at *3.
Id. at *1 n.1.
Id.
Id. at *3.
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Thus, insufficient staffing resulting in bodily harm is sufficient
199
in some cases to show recklessness under EADACPA.
Insufficient staffing is also at the core of Trujillo v. Superior
200
Court of Los Angeles County, where the Court of Appeal, Second
District, reversed the demurrer sustained by the trial court, holding
that “[w]hile certainly not as egregious as the situations depicted in
Delaney and Mack, the facts alleged by petitioner here state a cause
201
In Trujillo, the plaintiff’s mother,
of action for elder abuse.”
202
Clara Reyes, died of sepsis caused by an infected skin ulcer. She
was first treated on January 11, 2000, by a home health nurse who
203
scheduled a subsequent visit on January 13, 2000. When no nurse
appeared on January 13, the patient’s family called because her
204
infection was seeping, smelling awful, and getting worse.
The
Home Health Agency informed them that they did not have a
205
nurse available. The next day someone from the agency called to
206
When a nurse
instruct the family how to change the dressings.
failed to appear for two more days, the plaintiffs took Ms. Reyes to
207
the hospital, where she died on February 20, 2000.
Associate Justice Grignon dissented in Trujillo, arguing that the
facts did not demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, that
208
the defendants neglected Ms. Reyes. He concluded:
Here, in stark contrast to Delaney and Mack, plaintiff has
failed to allege any facts showing reckless neglect, but has
alleged only conduct showing professional negligence.
Patient was not a residential patient, but rather resided in
the home of her family. Home Health Agency had no
control over Patient’s hospitalization. Patient was under
the sporadic care of Home Health Agency for only five
days. Home Health Agency did not cause Patient’s
decubitus ulcers that eventually led to Patient’s death.
Home Health Agency did not leave Patient to deteriorate
for an extended period of time. Home Health Agency did
not abandon Patient. Home Health Agency missed a
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

See also Arnold & Arnold, supra note 80, at 32.
No. B155860, 2002 WL 1558830 (Cal. Ct. App. July 16, 2002).
Id. at *4.
Id. at *1.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *5 (Grignon, J., dissenting).
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single at-home visit and instead telephoned wound care
instructions to the Patient’s family the next day. Two days
later, Patient’s family had admitted her to the hospital. . . .
In my view, the trial court properly sustained the
demurrer as to the elder abuse cause of action. Though
dressed up with exaggerated allegations of the Home
Health Agency’s broader misconduct, the actual
deficiencies alleged do not constitute egregious acts of
209
neglect, but ordinary professional negligence.
Surprisingly, despite the being a very close case with a strong
dissent, the Court of Appeal, Second District, chose not to publish
Trujillo as precedent.
210
In Pagarigan v. Greater Valley Medical Group, Inc., the court of
appeal heard a complicated appeal with a number of interrelated
defendants. The plaintiffs alleged that the nursing home operator,
LibbyCare-Longwood, allowed the decedent to develop a severe
pressure sore on her lower back that measured five by eight
211
inches.
Additionally, she developed a severe infection at the
entry site of her gastric feeding tube, which caused her abdomen to
212
distend and darken in color.
Finally, the plaintiffs alleged that
the defendant did not transfer her to an acute care facility until it
213
On the
was too late, when she was sent to hospice care to die.
issue of professional negligence and elder abuse, the court held
that the plaintiff had “failed to allege a sufficient degree of
recklessness,” and that the trial court had abused its discretion in
214
refusing to permit amendment of the complaint.
Presumably,
the claim, as alleged, lacked evidence of a callous disregard of the
decedent’s welfare, necessary to connect her horrific injuries with
the defendant’s behavior.
215
In Marchesano v. Dekkers,
the Court of Appeal, Second
District, affirmed the trial court’s judgment on the pleadings in
favor of the defendant, a physician who failed to identify a hip
216
fracture in a nursing home patient.
Richard Marchesano, an

209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

Id. at *8–9.
No. B172642, 2006 WL 2425298 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 23, 2006).
Id. at *1.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *14.
No. B180297, 2006 WL 1351474 (Cal. Ct. App. May 18, 2006).
Id. at *1.
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eighty-year-old, injured himself getting out of a wheelchair.
Dr.
218
Dekkers did not diagnosis the fracture in the x-ray. Despite Mr.
Marchesano’s complaint of severe leg pain and request for
additional x-rays, Dr. Dekkers did not examine Mr. Marchesano
219
until his next scheduled rounds. About two months later, family
members took Mr. Marchesano “to an orthopedist who diagnosed a
220
fractured hip that was two to three months old.”
Both the trial
court and court of appeal found that the plaintiffs, Marchesano’s
heirs, failed to prove any degree of recklessness or maliciousness on
221
the part of Dr. Dekker.
The court concluded that the plaintiffs
“may not recast the medical malpractice action as a claim for elder
222
abuse.”
223
In Renko v. Northridge Care Center, Inc., the Court of Appeal,
Second District, reversed the trial court’s dismissal of professional
negligence and wrongful death claims against a nursing home and
physician, but affirmed the dismissal of the elder abuse and neglect
224
claim.
The decedent, Paul J. Renko Sr., developed stage IV
pressure sores, which “became severely infected with, among other
things, necrotizing fasciatus (the so-called ‘flesh-eating bacteria’)
which ‘ate’ into important organs and structures in his body
including portions of his genitalia. His infections remained
untreated for a lengthy period of time, leading to the loss of
225
substantial tissue, excruciating pain and death.”
The court of
appeal found the allegations that the physician, Dr. Dowds, failed
to properly treat severe anemia, dehydration, malnutrition, and
decubitus ulcers alongside his failure to transfer Mr. Renko to a
hospital when it became clear that the nursing home could not
meet his needs, were sufficient to demonstrate professional
226
negligence.
Nonetheless, because the plaintiffs “failed to plead
the level of culpability required to establish elder abuse,” the court
of appeal sustained the dismissal of elder abuse and neglect
227
claims. The court observed:
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *1–2.
Id. at *4.
Nos. B173512, B175474, 2005 WL 2045352 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 25, 2005).
Id. at *24.
Id. at *1.
Id. at *7.
Id. at *20.
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Here, in contrast to the facts in both Mack v. Soung and
Delaney v. Baker, appellants have alleged conduct rising
only to the level of professional negligence, not reckless
neglect. The key distinction between this matter and the
foregoing cases is that appellants have failed to allege that
any defendant knew about decedent’s deteriorating
condition and thereafter failed to act. Rather, appellants
alleged that defendants failed to provide adequate
medical care and that, as a result of that failure, decedent
suffered injury. They further alleged that defendants
“knew or should have known” that decedent required
hospitalization to avoid further injury. But there is no
indication in the elder abuse statutes that constructive
228
knowledge suffices to establish recklessness.
Thus, the court of appeal, Second District, was unwilling to
impute constructive knowledge, the “should have known” standard,
to determine whether a defendant acted beyond gross negligence
229
into a state of recklessness.
230
In Reyome v. Sunrise Senior Living Services, Inc., the court
applied the Delaney standard to an accident wherein a nursing
home resident with Alzheimer’s disease was dropped during a
transfer from her wheelchair to her bed and the resulting brain
231
trauma caused her death within six hours. While the transfer did
not completely comply with the facility’s written transfer policy, the
court found there was no indication that the deviation from those
procedures constituted a “deliberate disregard” for the decedent’s
safety resulting in a “high degree of probability” that an injury
would result, or that it was part of a “conscious choice of a course
232
of action . . . with knowledge of the serious danger to others.”
Thus, the actions of the staff constituted negligence at most, not
233
elder abuse.
234
In Furlong v. Catholic Healthcare West, the plaintiffs brought an
EADACPA abuse complaint against physicians and other health
care providers for failing to honor an elder’s “do not resuscitate”
order, keeping her alive and in debilitating pain for an additional

228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

Id. at *22.
See id.
No. B174986, 2004 WL 2749811 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 2, 2004).
Id. at *1.
Id. at *7.
Id. at *8.
No. B172067, 2004 WL 2958274 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 22, 2004).
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235

ten days.
The trial court dismissed the action and the Court of
Appeal, Second District, affirmed the dismissal, holding that “the
resuscitation of a dying patient does not amount to the failure to
provide medical care as discussed in Delaney, but rather describes
236
negligence in the undertaking of medical care.”
237
In Doepke v. Ponhold, the court of appeal affirmed summary
judgment against a plaintiff who sued his doctor for medical
238
When Mr. Doepke, who was
negligence and elder abuse.
recovering from a stroke in an assisted living facility, complained of
leg pain, a therapist measured his legs and found a three to four
239
inch difference. Dr. Ponhold read the x-rays when they arrived,
five days after they were taken, but failed to discover Mr. Doepke’s
240
fractured hip.
Based on expert testimony that Dr. Ponhold did
not breach the standard of care sufficient to support a professional
negligence action, the court of appeal affirmed the grant of
summary judgment, holding that the plaintiff “failed to raise a
triable issue of material fact with respect to his negligence cause of
action and, therefore, cannot show ‘something more than
negligence’ as required under Welfare & Institutions Code section
241
15657.”
D. Court of Appeal, Third District
The Court of Appeal, Third District, cited Delaney six times,
with two published opinions which addressed professional
242
In
negligence and elder abuse, and four irrelevant decisions.
243
Mack v. Soung, an opinion certified for partial publication, the
court reversed the trial court’s demurrer of an elder abuse and
neglect claim against Dr. Lian Soung and the Covenant Care
244
Nursing and Rehabilitation Center.
The plaintiffs, the children
235. Id. at *1.
236. Id. at *10.
237. No. B153989, 2003 WL 116454 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 14, 2003).
238. Id. at *1.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. at *3.
242. The irrelevant opinions are: Towns v. Davidson, 54 Cal. Rptr. 3d 568, 575
(Ct. App. 2007); Teachers’ Ret. Bd. v. Genest, 65 Cal. Rptr. 3d 326, 337 (Ct. App.
2007); Souza v. Squaw Valley Ski Corp., 41 Cal. Rptr. 3d 389, 396 (Ct. App. 2006);
and Arbuckle-College City Fire Prot. Dist. v. Cnty. of Colusa, 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d 182,
192 (Ct. App. 2003).
243. 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 830 (Ct. App. 2000).
244. Id. at 837.
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of Ms. Girth Mack, alleged that in August 1996 Ms. Mack was left in
a bedpan for thirteen consecutive hours, resulting in the
245
development of an untreatable stage III bedsore. Dr. Soung and
the nursing home concealed the existence of the bedsore until
September 4, 1996, and refused to permit the plaintiffs to inspect
the injury until an ombudsman intervened on their behalf on
246
September 10, 1996. Dr. Soung opposed her hospitalization until
her condition worsened in October, and then he abandoned Ms.
Mack and refused to respond to repeated requests by nursing staff
247
to permit her hospitalization.
On October 8, 1996, Dr. Soung
mailed a notice of withdrawal of care to Ms. Mack’s former address
despite the fact that she was no longer competent, and that he
248
knew plaintiffs were making surrogate decisions on her behalf.
On October 9, 1996, he advised Sylvester Mack, Ms. Mack’s son,
that he would withdraw in thirty days unless the plaintiffs found
249
another physician earlier. Two days later, the nurses advised the
plaintiffs that Ms. Mack was dying, but that Dr. Soung refused to
250
permit her hospitalization. Because his authority was essential in
order to transfer her to the hospital, the plaintiffs were forced to
remove Ms. Mack’s wristband and “tell the emergency room staff
that she had no primary physician, in order to secure her
251
252
admission to the hospital.” Ms. Mack died on October 13, 1996.
After the trial court granted Dr. Soung a demurrer on the
claims of elder abuse and intentional infliction of emotional
distress, he “obtained an order granting summary judgment as to
plaintiffs’ only surviving cause of action, that of professional
negligence, on the ground that the total recoverable damages
against Dr. Soung could not exceed the amount plaintiffs already
253
received from a settling codefendant.”
On appeal, Dr. Soung
254
argued that his conduct was, at most, professionally negligent.
The court of appeal reversed the demurrer and summary
judgment, explaining that “[r]ecklessly withdrawing needed

245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.

Id. at 832.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 832–33.
Id. at 832.
Id. at 833.
Id. at 834.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol37/iss1/4

36

Mead: Unpublished Opinions and Citation Prohibitions: Judicial Muddling

242

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:1

medical care from an elderly patient with conscious disregard for
the high probability of injury or suffering, whether ‘willful
misconduct’ or not, is precisely the sort of egregious behavior
255
which the Legislature sought to remedy in passing the Act.”
The court also rejected Dr. Soung’s more sophisticated
argument, in which he claimed he was an on-call physician who did
not have “care and custody” over the patient, and, therefore,
256
pursuant to the definition of neglect in EADACPA, he was not in
257
violation.
In rejecting this interpretation, the court found that
Dr. Soung could be seen as liable under EADACPA, because there
were two groups defined in EADACPA as giving “care and custody”
258
to elders: “health practitioners” and “care custodians.”
“Health
259
practitioner” explicitly includes physicians. The court reinforced
its finding by noting that the legislature intended to convey that
each of these two groups had “care and custody,” as noted in the
“Mandatory and Nonmandatory Reports of Abuse” section of
EADACPA: “‘[a]ny person who has assumed full or intermittent
responsibility for care or custody of an elder or dependent adult,
whether or not that person receives compensation, including . . .
any elder or dependent adult care custodian, health
260
practitioner, . . . is a mandated reporter.’” The court concluded:
Dr. Soung’s interpretation would impose liability on
residential institutions housing the elderly for willful
deprivation of medical care, but exempt physicians from
engaging in the same conduct. The statutory language
does not so provide. Moreover, there is no evidence the
Legislature intended to leave such a loophole in the Act.
As Delaney teaches, liability under the Act should not turn
upon the licensing status of the defendant. We conclude
that Dr. Soung’s status as a physician does not immunize

255. Id. at 835 n.4.
256. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 15610.57 (West 2010) (“‘Neglect’ means either
of the following: (1) The negligent failure of any person having the care or
custody of an elder or a dependent adult to exercise that degree of care that a
reasonable person in a like position would exercise. (2) The negligent failure of
an elder or dependent adult to exercise that degree of self care that a reasonable
person in a like position would exercise.”).
257. Mack, 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 835.
258. Id.
259. Id.; see also CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 15610.37 (defining “health
practitioner”).
260. Mack, 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 835 (quoting CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §
15630(a)) (emphasis removed).
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261

him from liability for elder abuse.
Mack, resting on evidence of reckless behavior on the part of a
resentful physician, provides a second egregious example of
physician elder abuse and neglect which amplifies the facts and
holding of Delaney. As a partially published opinion, it is frequently
cited alongside Delaney to elucidate the definition of reckless and
oppressive behavior sufficient to trigger section 15657’s heightened
262
remedies.
As the only published opinion which found a health care
practitioner guilty of professional negligence, but not elder abuse,
263
Massey v. Mercy Medical Center Redding, provides factual details
which contrast with the holding in Mack. Massey is a rare appellate
EADACPA case because it was brought by the patient himself, as he
264
survived the poor quality care. Carl R. Massey, a sixty-five-year-old
265
at the time of the incident, underwent bifemoral bypass surgery.
The nursing staff at Mercy Medical Center Redding noted after the
operation that Mr. Massey was a substantial fall risk, and would
266
need a walker and assistance. On March 9, 2006, Mr. Massey rang
267
for a nurse to help him to the bathroom. Nurse Ken O’Bar came
268
to his room and helped him out of bed and into his walker.
269
After
Nurse O’Bar then said he had to leave to do something.
fifteen minutes of waiting, Massey attempted to walk, fell
backwards, and hit his head, back, and behind on the wall and
270
floor of his room.
He sustained a compression fracture to his
271
272
back. He was apparently not found for two hours. Nurse O’Bar
administered morphine sulfate approximately four hours after the
273
fall.

261. Id. at 836 (citation omitted).
262. See, e.g., Trujillo v. Superior Court of Los Angeles Cnty., No. B155860,
2002 WL 1558830 (Cal. Ct. App. July 16, 2002) (citing both Mack and Delaney
numerous times).
263. 103 Cal. Rptr. 3d 209 (Ct. App. 2009).
264. Id. at 211.
265. Id. at 212.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 212–14.
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The original complaint alleged that nurse O’Bar was
274
“negligent” for leaving the plaintiff unattended in his walker.
The amended complaint alleged “medical negligence” not only for
the original complaint, but also for nurse O’Bar administering
morphine sulfate without a valid prescription and without
275
informed consent.
The Court of Appeal, Third District, upheld the trial court’s
decision to sustain the defendant’s motion for nonsuit, holding
that the evidence did not show “the necessary recklessness or
deliberate disregard that would sustain a cause of action for Elder
276
Abuse.” Additionally, there was insufficient evidence to show that
the nurse acted fraudulently by hiding the severity of the plaintiff’s
277
fall.
The fall and subsequent back pain were both noted in Mr.
Massey’s chart, making it difficult for the plaintiff to prove that the
278
defendant hid the severity of the fall. The court concluded that
279
Because the acts of
elder abuse requires more than negligence.
the defendant were negligent at most, they were barred by the
280
statute of limitations for professional negligence.
E. Court of Appeal, Fourth District
The Court of Appeal, Fourth District, has cited Delaney in
seventeen opinions, including twelve that are irrelevant to the
comparison of professional negligence and elder abuse or
281
The remaining five relevant opinions include three
neglect.
274. Id. at 215.
275. Id. at 216.
276. Id. at 217.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 216–17.
281. The irrelevant opinions are: Cotton v. StarCare Med. Grp., Inc., 107 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 767, 778 (Ct. App. 2010); Olsen v. N. Am. Co. for Life & Health Ins., Nos.
E041640, E045194, 2009 WL 3166639, at *7 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 2, 2009);
Hammermueller v. N. Am. Co. for Life & Health Ins., Nos. E041640, E045194,
2008 WL 4684773, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 23, 2008); Oshiro v. All Nations
Mission Church, No. E041323, 2008 WL 2082140, at *8 (Cal. Ct. App. May 19,
2008); McElroy v. Walsh, No. G038211, 2008 WL 2058169 (Cal. Ct. App. May 14,
2008); Wedbush Morgan Secs., Inc. v. Wilson, No. D049974, 2007 WL 3298901, at
*2 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 8, 2007); Hogan v. Country Villa Health Servs., 55 Cal. Rptr.
3d 450, 456 (Ct. App. 2007); Abrahams v. Jacob Health Care Ctr., L.L.C., No.
D046939, 2006 WL 2924841, at *6 n.13 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 13, 2006); Kuperman v.
Assessment Appeals Bd. No. 1, 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 703, 716 (Ct. App. 2006) (Aaron,
J., concurring); Smith v. Ben Bennett, Inc., 35 Cal. Rptr. 3d 612, 615 (Ct. App.
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published and two unpublished opinions.
282
In Marron v. Superior Court, summary judgment on behalf of
the defendant, the Regents of the University of California, was
vacated because deposition testimony sufficiently described reckless
283
neglect of a dependent adult. The decedent, Ms. Lidia Marron, a
forty-four-year-old dependent adult, had her middle colic vein
284
perforated during a liver biopsy.
She died four months later,
after suffering multiple complications “including fungus infections
in her blood and lungs, peritonitis, intra-abdominal and pelvic
abscesses, sepsis syndrome, hypotension, fevers, abdominal pain
285
The deposition testimony supporting a
and hemorrhaging.”
possible finding of reckless neglect on behalf of the nurses
included evidence of feces soiling Ms. Marron’s bed for hours, a
failure to bathe Ms. Marron despite her being soiled with blood
and feces, not brushing Ms. Marron’s teeth to prevent fungus
growing in her mouth, not assisting her to the bathroom despite
her incontinent condition, and, during one hemorrhaging
incident, not assisting “in putting pressure on the wound or
sopping up the blood, thus requiring the family members who were
286
present to attempt to control the bleeding on their own.”
Additionally, there was evidence that the hospital administration
had received complaints from the nurses about inadequate staffing
287
levels but failed to take remedial action.
288
In Norman v. Life Care Centers of America, Inc., the court of
appeal found that a nursing home’s failure to comply with
regulations regarding fall prevention constituted negligence per
289
se. The failure to comply with regulations was sufficiently related
to the decedent’s multiple falls and her eventual death, so the lack
290
The court
of compliance constituted neglect under EADACPA.
of appeal held that the trial court committed prejudicial error
when it refused to instruct the jury on the doctrine of negligence
2005); People v. Davis, 25 Cal. Rptr. 3d 92, 101 (Ct. App. 2005); and Bitters v.
Rutledge, No. E032427, 2003 WL 22701482, at *2 n.2 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 17,
2003).
282. 134 Cal. Rptr. 2d 358 (Ct. App. 2003).
283. Id. at 371.
284. Id. at 361.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 372 n.13.
287. Id at 371–72.
288. 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d 765 (Ct. App. 2003).
289. Id. at 776–78.
290. Id. at 777.
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per se, explaining that “[t]he doctrine of negligence per se does
not apply only to professional negligence causes of action. Rather,
it generally can apply to any cause of action based on or involving
negligence, including an elder abuse cause of action on a neglect
291
theory.”
The final published case from the Fourth District, Community
292
Care and Rehabilitation Center v. Superior Court, involved the same
issue as Covenant Care, Inc.: whether Section 425.13(a) of the
California Code of Civil Procedure requires application of
heightened procedural requirements for EADACPA claims seeking
293
The Fourth District answered in the
punitive damages.
affirmative, the opposite of the California Supreme Court in 2004
in Covenant Care, Inc.; thus, Community Care and Rehabilitation Center
294
is no longer good law.
In addition to the published cases, the Fourth District has two
unpublished cases that cite Delaney regarding the relationship
between professional negligence and elder abuse. In Eichenberg v.
295
San Diego Medical Services Enterprises, LLC, the court found that a
medical transportation company that convinced a nurse to
downgrade an elder’s transportation order from a gurney in an
ambulance to a wheelchair van did not act in a reckless manner
sufficient to sustain an elder neglect action because the evidence
did not establish “a conscious and deliberate decision to place [the
296
patient] in a high degree of risk.”
297
In Klinkner v. Alta Vista Health Care Center, the plaintiffs failed
to plead sufficient facts to indicate that a nursing home’s acts and
omissions were reckless, “with knowledge of or in conscious
298
disregard of a high probability of serious danger to” the patient.
The patient had a pre-existing decubitus ulcer on her coccyx and
299
suffered a badly dislocated hip in the facility. Although the court
found that there were “numerous failures to provide her with
proper care” the facts did “not indicate that Alta Vista acted with

291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.

Id. at 778.
94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 343 (Ct. App. 2000).
Id. at 344.
Id. at 349–50.
No. D049243, 2007 WL 4480735 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2007).
Id. at *7.
No. E037164, 2005 WL 3344801 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 9, 2005).
Id. at *6.
Id.
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300

recklessness.” The court reasoned that there was:
[N]o indication that any of Alta Vista’s alleged failures to
provide Isabell with timely or appropriate care occurred
over an extended period of time.
For example,
allegations that Alta Vista allowed Isabell to lie in her own
feces for “unreasonable amounts of time” and failed to
maintain staffing levels adequate to meet her needs do
not show that Alta Vista acted with a level of culpability
exceeding negligence. . . . Plaintiffs’ reliance on
301
Delaney . . . is misplaced.
F.

Court of Appeal, Fifth District

The Court of Appeal, Fifth District, only has two cases that
302
Keycite identifies as citing Delaney as authority: People v. Gahagan
303
and Estate of Morelli v. Eustice.
Both cases are unpublished
opinions. People v. Gahagan includes a typographical error in a
304
citation to People v. Buckhalter, which causes it to be incorrectly
identified by Keycite as citing Delaney. Estate of Morelli cites Delaney
only tangentially in relation to a will contest involving undue
305
influence and allegations of financial abuse.
Neither case
involves issues of professional negligence in comparison to elder
abuse or neglect.
G. Court of Appeal, Sixth District
The Court of Appeal, Sixth District, has five opinions that cite
Delaney. Four of the five opinions, two published and two
unpublished, are not relevant to the relationship of professional
306
negligence and elder abuse. The other opinion, Intrieri v. Superior
307
Court, is a published opinion that provides an in-depth analysis of

300. Id. at *7.
301. Id.
302. No. F055847, 2009 WL 2767757 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 2, 2009).
303. No. F046443, 2006 WL 1107599 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 27, 2006) .
304. Gahagan, 2009 WL 2767757, at *2.
305. Morelli, 2006 WL 1107599, at *12 n.13.
306. The irrelevant opinions are: Quiroz v. Seventh Ave. Ctr., 45 Cal. Rptr. 3d
222, 242 (Ct. App. 2006); Guardian N. Bay, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d
748, 758 (Ct. App. 2001); Sempervirens Fund v. Fox (In re Conservatorship of Pers.
& Estate of Collord), No. H027610, 2005 WL 1983893, at *7 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug.
17, 2005); and Listman v. Listman, No. H021975, 2002 WL 194248, at *7 (Cal. Ct.
App. Feb. 5, 2002).
307. 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 97 (Ct. App. 2004).
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elder abuse committed by health care professionals.
In Intrieri, Amalia Intrieri’s husband and son brought suit
308
under EADACPA against Guardian Postacute Services, Inc.
Ms.
Intrieri was an Alzheimer’s patient who was pushed by a nonAlzheimer’s patient, Janet Lawry, causing Ms. Intrieri to fall and
309
310
break her hip. Ms. Intrieri died two months later.
The trial court’s entry of summary judgment for Guardian was
reversed by the court of appeal as it found “triable questions of fact
exist[ed] as to the reckless neglect element of the cause of action
311
for elder abuse.”
The court found that the Guardian staff was
recklessly negligent in posting the keypad code above the keypad to
the entrance of the Alzheimer’s unit, leaving Ms. Lawry “unfettered
312
access” to the unit.
This recklessness constituted a conscious
disregard for the safety of Ms. Intrieri and other Alzheimer’s
patients because Ms. Lawry was allowed to enter the Alzheimer’s
unit and verbally abuse the patients without Guardian staff
intervention, despite knowledge that Ms. Lawry was in a confused
and hostile state—she already had threatened to kill a patient so
313
she could leave the nursing home.
Additionally, after Ms. Intrieri’s surgery to repair her hip, the
plaintiffs alleged that the nursing staff failed to follow a new care
plan for treatment of Ms. Intrieri’s bed sores, leading to the
amputation of her right toe, and eventually the amputation of her
314
leg up to the knee. The court of appeal reversed the trial court,
holding that there was sufficient evidence alleged of elder neglect
315
for both the insufficient security as well as the pressure sores.
H. Federal Cases
Three of the eight federal cases that cite Delaney are relevant
and warrant a brief mention, although they are not appellate
316
In
decisions and they will not be included in the final analysis.
308. Id. at 100.
309. Id.
310. Id. at 101.
311. Id. at 108.
312. Id. at 107.
313. Id. at 107–08.
314. Id. at 108.
315. Id. at 107–08.
316. The other five irrelevant opinions are: Martinez v. Adams, No. CV F 090899 LJO DLB, 2010 WL 892186, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2010); McGill v.
Wachovia Mortg. FSB Loan, No. 2:09-cv-2002 FCD/GGH, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
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317

Hougue v. City of Holtville,
a nursing home patient with
Alzheimer’s escaped, prompting the nursing staff to call the police
318
as they tried to follow him and bring him back to the facility. The
police violently subdued the patient, severely damaging his left arm
319
Applying California law, the federal trial court
beyond repair.
granted the nursing home’s motion to dismiss for abuse under
EADACPA but refused to dismiss the neglect claims or the
320
negligence claims.
321
In George v. Sonoma County Sheriff’s Department, a dependent
adult with sickle cell anemia was returned from a hospital to a jail,
where he died alone six days later, even though he was
322
nonresponsive, incontinent, and bed-ridden.
Several doctors
allegedly transferred him back to jail because they thought he was
323
malingering. In partially dismissing some of the claims, the trial
court dismissed an elder abuse claim against one of the doctors,
finding that there was insufficient evidence to show that he acted
324
recklessly.
Independently, the trial court also found that the
complaint did not adequately allege that the doctor had “care or
custody” of the patient sufficient to meet the definition of neglect
325
under EADACPA.
326
In Von Mangolt Hills v. Intensive Air, Inc., the federal trial
court denied a motion to dismiss an elder neglect case where an air
ambulance service left a patient on a gurney on an airport tarmac
327
for half-an-hour when it was over 100°F.
The court found that
the sunburn and exposure to extreme heat constituted a breach of
custodial care standards and refused to apply Section 425.13 of the
328
California Code of Civil Procedure to the case. In sum, like the
California trial courts, the federal courts look back to Delaney for
43393, at *34 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2010); Quintero Family Trust v. OneWest Bank,
F.S.B., No. 09-CV-1561-IEG (WVG), 2010 WL 392312, at *16 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 27,
2010); Cabral v. Cnty. of Glenn, 624 F. Supp. 2d 1184, 1194 (E.D. Cal. 2009); and
Negrete v. Fid. & Guar. Life Ins. Co., 444 F. Supp. 2d 998, 1002 (C.D. Cal. 2006).
317. No. 07cv2229 WQH (WMC), 2008 WL 1925249 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2008).
318. Id. at *1.
319. Id.
320. Id. at *5–7.
321. No. C-08-02675 EDL, 2009 WL 656299 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2009).
322. Id. at *2.
323. Id.
324. Id. at *6.
325. Id.
326. No. C06-03300 JSW, 2007 WL 521222 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 15, 2007).
327. Id. at *5.
328. Id. at *4.
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guidance on finding abuse and neglect under EADACPA.
I.

Summary

Of the ninety-six opinions that cite Delaney, twenty-two are
California Court of Appeal decisions that cite it regarding the
delineation of professional negligence and elder abuse or neglect
committed by health care professionals.
An additional five
published opinions cite related issues of the applicability of
punitive damages, statutes of limitations, and attorney fees
standards of proof under section 15657, and were included in this
article to give a fully rounded view of the statutory interpretation of
section 15657.
Of the court of appeal opinions, only six are published cases
that squarely address the difference between professional
negligence and elder abuse: Sababin from the Second District; Mack
and Massey from the Third District; Marron and Norman from the
Fourth District; and Intrieri from the Sixth District. These decisions
329
are indistinguishable from the sixteen unpublished opinions
addressing the same issue. In eleven of the sixteen relevant
unpublished opinions, the court sided with the defendant on
appeal concerning the issue of imposition of elder abuse or neglect
against a health care professional. When considered as a whole,
plaintiffs won ten of the twenty-two identified appellate cases, five
published and five unpublished decisions. Defendants won the
remaining twelve cases.
Nevertheless, of the six published cases, only Massey represents
330
a victory for the defendant health care practitioner. Only Massey
illuminates the other side of the line, examining actions that would
likely have been found negligent but not abusive, had they not
331
been barred by MICRA’s statute of limitations. Only Massey, and
the five published opinions on the other side of the line, may be
332
cited in California courts as authority.

329. The unpublished version of Sababin is not included in this total as it was
replaced by the published version.
330. See Massey v. Mercy Med. Ctr. Redding, 103 Cal. Rptr. 3d 209, 211–12 (Ct.
App. 2009).
331. See id. at 217.
332. See CAL. RULES OF COURT, R. 8.1115.
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V. PRECEDENT AND THE CITATION OF UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS
The citation of unpublished opinions has been a significant
topic of interest since the release of Judge Richard Arnold’s
333
decision in Anastasoff v. United States. In Anastasoff, Judge Arnold
responded to the Internal Revenue Service lawyers’ citation of an
unpublished Eighth Circuit mailbox rule decision, Christie v. United
334
States, as authority, which he believed should have controlled his
335
He held that the Eighth Circuit’s
decision in Anastasoff.
publication rule, Rule 28A(i), which allowed panels to declare
some opinions like Christie “non-precedential” was unconstitutional
under Article III of the United States Constitution because “it
purports to confer on the federal courts a power that goes beyond
336
the ‘judicial.’”
Judge Arnold reasoned that “[i]nherent in every
judicial decision is a declaration and interpretation of a general
337
principle or rule of law,” and that the declarations of law are
“authoritative to the extent necessary for the decision, and must be
338
applied in subsequent cases to similarly situated parties.”
He
concluded that the declaration and interpretation of law and its
subsequent application in similar cases forms the foundation of the
doctrine of precedent that the founders intended the federal
339
courts to follow when they wrote Article III.
In an en banc decision of the Eighth Circuit, also authored by
Judge Arnold, Anastasoff was rendered moot, and thus vacated on
procedural grounds because the Internal Revenue Service
acquiesced to another circuit’s decision, and Faye Anastasoff was
340
paid the full amount of her claim, plus interest.
The
constitutionality of the Eighth Circuit’s publication rule remained
an open question as the underlying case was vacated.
Many academic and judicial articles and lectures have drawn
battle lines around the key question in Anastasoff: do the federal
courts have the power to determine that some opinions have no
341
precedential effect?
Much like California, some federal circuits,
333. 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2000).
334. No. 91-2375MN, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 38446 (8th Cir. Mar. 20, 1992)
(per curiam).
335. See Anastoff, 223 F.3d at 899.
336. Id.
337. Id. at 899–900.
338. Id. at 900.
339. Id.
340. See Anastasoff v. United States, 235 F.3d 1054, 1056 (8th Cir. 2000).
341. See, e.g., David R. Cleveland, Overturning the Last Stone: The Final Step in
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notably the Fifth and Ninth Circuits, had publication rules that
gave unpublished opinions no precedential weight, and then, as an
extra measure, forbade the citation of unpublished opinions,
except in limited circumstances involving res judicata and law of
342
the case. But, unpublished decisions had risen to over eighty-four
343
percent of all circuit decisions by 2006.
It may seem unnecessary to explore the Anastasoff debate in
more detail, as the Federal Appellate Rules Committee
spearheaded a rule to standardize the nation’s publication and
citation rules—Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1—which
344
The rule prohibits federal
went into effect on January 1, 2007.
courts from restricting the citation of federal judicial opinions,
orders, judgments, or other written dispositions that have been
“designated as ‘unpublished,’ ‘not for publication,’ ‘nonprecedential,’ ‘not precedent,’ or the like,” and which were issued
345
on or after January 1, 2007. If a party cites such an unpublished
opinion, they must file and serve a copy of the opinion if it is not
available in a publicly accessible electronic database, such as a

Returning Precedential Status to All Opinions, 10 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 61, 62 (2009)
(“Do American courts have the authority to render decisions not binding on
future courts, and, even if they do, should they issue such decisions?”); Patrick J.
Schiltz, The Citation of Unpublished Opinions in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 74
FORDHAM L. REV. 23, 27 (2005) (discussing “the simple question whether a litigant
who submits a paper to, say, the Second Circuit may cite in that paper an
unpublished opinion of the Second Circuit (or any other federal court).”);
William M. Richman, Much Ado About the Tip of an Iceberg, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1723, 1724 (2005) (discussing proposed rule’s treatment of unpublished
decisions); Martha Dragich Pearson, Citation of Unpublished Opinions as Precedent, 55
HASTINGS L.J. 1235, 1236 (2004) (discussing precedential value of unpublished
opinions); Robert A. Mead, “Unpublished” Opinions as the Bulk of the Iceberg:
Publication Patterns in the Eighth and Tenth Circuits of the United States Courts of
Appeals, 93 LAW LIBR. J. 589, 589 (2001) (examining “the debate regarding
unpublished opinions in the federal courts.”); Danny J. Boggs & Brian P. Brooks,
Unpublished Opinions and the Nature of Precedent, 4 GREEN BAG 2d 17, 18 (2000)
(“The unpublished opinion is tolerated for reasons involving such pedestrian
considerations as efficiency in judicial administration.”); Richard S. Arnold,
Unpublished Opinions: A Comment, 1 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 219, 219 (1999)
(examining the effect of “opinions handed down by the federal courts of appeals
are marked ‘Not To Be Published.’”).
342. For an excellent summary of the debate concerning Anastasoff and a list
of each circuit and state publication and citation rule, circa 2002, see Steve
Sheppard, The Unpublished Opinion Opinion: How Richard Arnold’s Anastasoff Opinion
is Saving America’s Courts from Themselves, 2002 ARK. L. NOTES 85 (2002).
343. Cleveland, supra note 341, at 62.
344. FED. R. APP. P. 32.1.
345. Id.
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346

circuit’s website.
Nonetheless, some commentators have noted
that this rule change does nothing to address Judge Arnold’s most
important question: whether these unpublished decisions have any
347
precedential value.
A. California’s Opinion Publication and Citation Rules
Rule 976, the predecessor of California’s current publication
348
and citation rule, was established in 1964, the same year the
Federal Judicial Conference recommended federal publication of
only opinions that had “general precedential value” because of the
cost and difficulty of keeping up with the exponentially increasing
349
size of case reporters. The 1966 California Constitution Revision
Committee incorporated this concept of selected precedential
350
value.
Rule 976 prohibited the publication of opinions in the
Official Reports unless the opinion:
(1) [E]stablishes a new rule of law, applies an existing rule

346. Id.
347. Cleveland, supra note 341, at 62; J. Lyn Entrikin Goering, Legal Fiction of
the “Unpublished” Kind: The Surreal Paradox of No-Citation Rules and the Ethical Duty of
Candor, 1 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REV. 27 (2005) (considering the then-proposed
language to the rule).
348. Kenneth J. Schmier & Michael K. Schmier, Has Anyone Noticed the
Judiciary’s Abandonment of Stare Decisis?, 7 J. L. & SOC. CHALLENGES 233, 239 (2005).
The Schmier brothers are California activists against non-publication and,
especially, citation prohibition rules. They maintain a valuable website on the
issue, www.nonpublication.com, where they reprint many of the articles and press
clippings regarding the debate, especially in California. THE COMMITTEE FOR THE
RULE OF LAW, http://www.nonpublication.com.
349. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF
THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 1964, 11 (Government
Printing Office 1964); see also CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON
RULES FOR PUBLICATION OF COURT OF APPEAL OPINIONS, REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS, 9 (Nov. 2006), http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/courts/supreme
/comm/documents/sc_report_12-7-06.pdf
[hereinafter
“REPORT
AND
RECOMMENDATIONS”] (“During the 1950’s, the courts annually produced an
average of about 10 volumes of Court of Appeal opinions, with each volume
averaging about two-thirds of the number of pages of modern volumes. This
increased to an average of approximately 13 volumes a year in the early 1960’s.
The increase in the number of volumes raised concerns that the bench and the
bar were being inundated by the volume of Court of Appeal opinions.”).
350. Article VI, section 14 of the California Constitution provides in part: “The
Legislature shall provide for the prompt publication of such opinions of the
Supreme Court and courts of appeal as the Supreme Court deems appropriate,
and those opinions shall be available for publication by any person.” CAL. CONST.
art. VI, § 14.
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to a set of facts significantly different from those stated in
the published opinions, or modifies or criticizes with
reasons given, an existing rule; (2) resolves or creates an
apparent conflict in the law; (3) involves a legal issue of
continuing public interest; or (4) makes a significant
contribution to legal literature by reviewing either the
development of a common law rule or the legislative or
judicial history of a provision of a constitution, statute, or
351
other written law.
In 1977, Rule 977, the citation prohibition for unpublished
opinions, was added to ensure a level playing field as some lawyers,
such as district attorneys, had ready access to unpublished opinions
due to the number of cases they collectively handled, whereas most
352
lawyers did not.
California’s limited publication rule, combined with the
almost unique depublication rule and the citation prohibition, led
353
to significant rancor among some lawyers.
Starting in 2000,
members of the bar began approaching legislators to try to change
354
the publication and citation rules.
In response to legislative
pressure, Chief Justice George of the California Supreme Court
appointed an Advisory Committee in 2004 with the mandate to
“review the rules for publication of Courts of Appeal opinions and
recommend whether the rules should be changed to better ensure
the publication of those opinions that may assist in the reasoned
355
and orderly development of the law.”
In 2006, the California Supreme Court’s Advisory Committee
on Rules for Publication of Court of Appeal Opinions released a
356
report evaluating Rule 8.1105.
The Committee was chaired by
Associate Justice Kathryn Werdegar of the California Supreme
Court and was comprised of six Associate Justices of the California
courts of appeal, and six attorneys, including the principal attorney
to the chief justice of the California Supreme Court and the

351. Schmier & Schmier, supra note 348, at 239 (citing CAL. RULES OF COURT R.
976 (1996)).
352. Id.
353. Id., at 239–40; see also, Richard H. Cooper & David R. Fine, What’s Past is
Prologue, 43 ORANGE COUNTY LAW. 25, 25 (Feb. 2001) (“The battle between the
supporters and opponents of the rule is reaching a flash-point, and the outcome is
by no means certain.”).
354. Cooper, supra note 353, at 27–28.
355. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 349, at 1, 5–6.
356. Id. at 1.
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reporter of decisions of the California Supreme Court.
The
Advisory Committee was charged to “review the rules for the
publication of Court of Appeal opinions and recommend whether
the rules should be changed to better ensure the publication of
those opinions that may assist in the reasoned and orderly
358
development of the law.”
Predictably, given the “insider”
composition of the Advisory Committee, it only recommended
359
modest changes to the rules.
Methodologically, the Advisory Committee examined the
publication statistics of the courts of appeal and the experiences of
360
other states and the federal courts.
They also surveyed the
justices of the courts of appeal and appellate attorneys concerning
361
the publication rules. Eighty-six of the 101 justices of the courts
362
Instead of using a random
of appeal responded to the survey.
sample of the California Bar, the Advisory Committee focused the
survey towards attorneys and organizations with significant
363
appellate practice, resulting in only about 300 responses.
Despite the potential for statistical skew with such a small
sample, the results of the surveys are both interesting and
troubling:
Both the justices and the attorneys were asked whether
they believe anything other than the rules—such as local
traditions, standards, or practices—influences the court’s
determination whether or not to certify an opinion for
publication. . . . Although the great majority of justices
stated that nothing other than the publication rules
influences their determinations, 20 percent indicated that
other factors may influence their decisions. This finding
was consistent statewide; there were no statistically
significant differences in the responses received from the
districts. Other factors cited by the justices included that
357. Id. at iii–iv.
358. Id. at 1.
359. The Committee even prohibited outsiders from attending their meetings.
Schmier & Schmier, supra note 348, at 243.
360. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 349, at 19.
361. Id.at 32.
362. Id. at 7, 32.
363. Id. at 33. The lack of participation by trial court litigants and judges
makes these results much less reliable. See J. Thomas Sullivan, Unpublished Opinions
and No Citation Rules in the Trial Courts, 47 ARIZ. L REV. 419 (2005) (arguing that
trial court judges and attorneys have frequent need to access the analysis found in
unpublished decisions and are put into dangerous ethical quandaries by nocitation rules).
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the case involves a recurring issue, concern about
criticizing an attorney or trial judge, and the pressure of
workload. In contrast, a majority of attorneys—56
percent—believed that factors other than the publication
rules have an influence on the justices’ publication
decisions. Factors that the attorneys suggested influence
the courts’ determination of whether to publish included
encouraging or avoiding scrutiny or review and a panel’s
or district’s preference regarding publication frequency.
The attorneys were also asked whether they believe the
publication rules are uniformly followed. Here too, the
majority of attorneys—67 percent—believed that the
364
publication rules are not uniformly followed.
In addition to the appellate bar’s skepticism about the bench’s
adherence to the opinion publication guidelines, ninety-two
percent of bar respondents stated that they used unpublished
365
opinions in their practice. Even more surprisingly:
Fifty-eight percent of the justices stated that they have
relied on unpublished opinions when drafting opinions.
Most of these justices indicated that they do so in order to
consider the rationale or analysis used in a similar
decision or to ensure consistency with their own prior
rulings as well as those within their district or division.
Some justices also use unpublished opinions as a source of
366
boilerplate language.
Nevertheless, when asked whether parties should be allowed to
draw the supreme court’s attention to an unpublished opinion,
only twenty-eight percent of the justices of the courts of appeals
367
said yes, as compared to sixty-seven percent of the bar.
Apparently, the justices of the courts of appeal wanted it both
ways—they wanted the guidance garnered from unpublished
opinions without the threat of having others draw attention to
them through citation.
Despite the admission of most of the justices of the courts of
appeal that they rely on unpublished opinions, the Advisory
Committee found that “by and large, the current publication rules
and practices have been successful in creating and managing an
accessible body of precedential appellate opinions that provide
364.
365.
366.
367.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 349, at 38–39.
Id. at 41.
Id.
Id. at 41–42.
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useful guidance for litigants and the public.”
It eventually
recommended that the supreme court revise Rule 8.1105 to
include a presumption in favor of publication if a court of appeal
finds one of the following factors:
Rule 8.1105
(c) Standard for certification
An opinion of a Court of Appeal or a superior court
appellate division—whether it affirms or reverse a trial
court order or judgment—should be certified for
publication in the Official Reports if the opinion:
(1) Establishes a new rule of law;
(2) Applies an existing rule of law to a set of facts
significantly different from those stated in published
opinions;
(3) Modifies, explains, or criticizes with reasons
given, an existing rule of law;
(4) Advances a new interpretation, clarification,
criticism, or construction of a provision of a
constitution, statute, ordinance, or court rule;
(5) Addresses or creates an apparent conflict in the
law;
(6) Involves a legal issue of continuing public
interest;
(7) Makes a significant contribution to legal
literature by reviewing either the development of a
common law rule or the legislative or judicial history
of a provision of a constitution, statute, or other
written law;
(8) Invokes a previously overlooked rule of law, or
reaffirms a principle of law not applied in a recently
reported decision; or
(9) Is accompanied by a separate opinion concurring
or dissenting on a legal issue, and publication of the
majority and separate opinions would make a
significant contribution to the development of the
369
law.
The Advisory Committee also recommended that the supreme
court list the factors that should not be considered by the courts of
appeal when deciding whether to publish an opinion: “Factors such
368.
369.

Id. at 1.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 349, at 57, 59.
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as the workload of the court, or the potential embarrassment of a
litigant, lawyer, judge, or other person should not affect the
370
determination of whether to publish an opinion.” The supreme
371
The
court accepted and implemented both recommendations.
Advisory Committee did not recommend modifying the
unpublished opinion citation prohibition rule, which currently
reads:
Rule 8.1115. Citation of opinions
(a) Unpublished opinion
Except as provided in (b), an opinion of a California
Court of Appeal or superior court appellate division that
is not certified for publication or ordered published must
not be cited or relied on by a court or a party in any other
action.
(b) Exceptions
An unpublished opinion may be cited or relied on:
(1) When the opinion is relevant under the doctrines
of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel;
or
(2) When the opinion is relevant to a criminal or
disciplinary action because it states reasons for a
decision affecting the same defendant or respondent
in another such action.
(c) Citation procedure
A copy of an opinion citable under (b) or of a cited
opinion of any court that is available only in a computerbased source of decisional law must be furnished to the
court and all parties by attaching it to the document in
which it is cited or, if the citation will be made orally, by
letter within a reasonable time in advance of citation.
(d) When a published opinion may be cited
A published California opinion may be cited or relied on
as soon as it is certified for publication or ordered
372
published.
The Advisory Committee’s efforts in expanding the
publication rule may produce more published EADACPA opinions
in the future, but only one recent opinion, Massey, has been
released for publication by any of the courts of appeal. Unless Rule
370.
371.
372.

Id. at 59.
See CAL. RULES OF COURT, R. 8.1105.
Id. R. 8.1115.
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8.1115 is relaxed to allow attorneys to cite or argue the
unpublished opinions, which fifty-eight percent of the surveyed
justices of the courts of appeal admit they are already using while
373
drafting opinions, California is in danger of continuing to
muddle the interpretation of EADACPA.
B. Impact of Unpublished Opinions on EADACPA
The twenty-two cases that directly address the Delaney
distinction between professional negligence and elder abuse are
complicated as far as their details, but broad generalizations
emerge upon close inspection. First, cases that involve missed
diagnosis such as Trengali, Marchesano, and Doepke are likely to be
deemed professional negligence rather than elder abuse.
Diagnosis is at the heart of the practice of medicine. Categorizing
missed diagnoses as a negligent mistake rather than a reckless
disregard for the patient is relatively easy. These decisions are all
unpublished and were decided within a few years of Delaney.
Perhaps the appellate panels that wrote these decisions were
unwilling to publish decisions that openly distinguished the facts in
those cases from Delaney, but by failing to publish, they deprived
the health care industry of precedent for use in cases where the
allegations suggest traditional medical malpractice analyses.
Next, cases that involve patterns of failure to treat known
injuries or illnesses, such as Sababin, Mack, Norman, Marron, Intrieri,
Hubbard, Camacho, Gibson, Trujillo, and Leong are likely to have been
decided for the plaintiffs, and about half were published. The
unpublished cases in this category are similar enough to the
published cases that the only rationale as to why they were not all
published is that the unpublished cases are, on average, newer than
the published ones, thus suggesting that the appellate panels are
finding that the facts are no longer significantly different enough
from the previous cases to warrant publication. If this is the case,
the panels are glossing over the possibility that the specific actions
of the physicians and nurses are different enough that future courts
could factually distinguish cases if the cases were published.
Finally, cases where health care professionals made isolated
harmful decisions, such as the dropped patient in Reyome, the
wrong transportation methodology in Eichenberg, and the fall
followed by the unauthorized pain killer in Massey are likely to be
373.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 349, at 41.
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decided for the defendants, and, with the exception of Massey,
unlikely to be published. This makes some sense in light of the
error-correcting function of the courts of appeal. There is little
public policy at stake when an employee simply used bad judgment
and committed malpractice or another form of negligence. To
dispose of these cases with an unpublished decision is a quick,
effective course of action for the panel. This does not explain why
the panel thought to publish Massey when no other panel had
decided to publish a case where the defendants had won on the
elder abuse action.
Two other elder abuse legal scholars have commented on the
relative lack of published precedent that interprets or applies
EADACPA. Seymour Moskowitz, a law professor at Valparaiso Law
School, explains the over-arching reasons for the lack of EADACPA
case law:
Outside the institutional context, i.e., nursing homes and
hospitals, few cases employing civil tort or EADACPA
remedies may be found in the published California
reports. I suspect a variety of reasons are responsible for
this lack of precedent. Recovery is often unfeasible
against perpetrators, whether family or third parties, who
are judgment proof or have limited resources. Elder
abuse is often hidden; wrongful behavior is rarely revealed
to those outside the family circle. Parents often fail to
report maltreatment because of the “shame and stigma of
having to admit they raised such a child. . . . Instead they
react with denial, psychological acquiescence, and passive
acceptance. Fear and illness also deter participation in
the legal process. Often, the victim and the abuser are in
a mutually dependent relationship, and the victim has no
374
other caretaker.
Thus, based on a careful search for EADACPA cases using
LexisNexis, Professor Moskowitz contends that few non-nursing
375
home elder abuse cases are published in California.
A case
against a physician or other health professional for abusive
behavior in an institution is more likely to draw attention than the
common abuse that is perpetrated in private homes by family

374. Seymour Moskowitz, Golden Age in the Golden State: Contemporary Legal
Developments in Elder Abuse and Neglect, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 589, 607–08 (2003)
(footnotes omitted).
375. Id. at 607 n.94.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2010

55

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 1 [2010], Art. 4

2010]

UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS

261

376

members or friends.
In addition to being potential—albeit
relatively infrequent—perpetrators of elder abuse, physicians as a
group are unreliable as mandatory reporters of elder abuse; thus,
they are not as effective as they could be in helping to decrease
377
such abuse.
Within the context of nursing home litigation, where most of
the non-financial abuse EADACPA cases are found, Bryan Carney, a
nursing home defense lawyer, quietly critiques the lack of
published decisions:
A series of published and nonpublished opinions since
Delaney have begun to give a judicial gloss to the term
“elder abuse.” After 16 years of experience with enhanced
remedies for elder abuse, “reckless neglect” has become
the favorite (and the most frequently litigated) species of
elder abuse.
More importantly, courts are using
nonstatutory markers to draw the line between elder
abuse and professional negligence—namely, the length of
time that the elder is exposed to abuse or neglect and
what the healthcare provider knew about the elder’s
condition during that time. No opinion expressly claims
these two factors are dispositive, but a fair reading of
published and unpublished cases strongly suggests that
these two factors decide the difference between statutory
378
elder abuse and simple, common law negligence.
Additionally, he notes “Klinkner and Trujillo are unpublished,
but they offer some insight into how the courts look at the period
of alleged mistreatment to determine whether the lawsuit is one for
379
elder abuse or negligence.”
Finally, he concludes, perhaps as
loudly as he finds prudent, that:
Two published cases illustrate how concealing or ignoring
an elder’s condition may constitute elder abuse. But no
published case defines the goalpost at the opposite end of
the field—namely, when will a defendant’s knowledge (or
lack of knowledge) of an elder’s condition not be
sufficient to support a claim of elder abuse? On that side
of the question, little guidance exists. The cases are

376. See id. at 608 (offering several reasons why family member abuse may be
reported at a lower rate than institutional abuse).
377. See id. at 611 (discussing the evidence of the infrequency of mandatory
reporting).
378. Carney, supra note 17, at 44.
379. Id. at 45.
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380

unpublished.
In 2009, Massey began the process of defining the goalpost
opposite Delaney and Mack, but Massey is barely adequate in that it
does not address the situation where there was a particularly
381
gruesome and long-lasting period of suffering, such as Renko.
Renko, from a defense perspective, would have been a useful case to
have had published as it addresses the question of culpability within
the context of a case with similar outcomes to Delaney, Mack, and
Marron. Defense attorneys, however, are prohibited by Rule 8.1115
382
from citing Renko or Trengali for almost any reason.
EADACPA cases are published at a much higher rate—27
percent for the twenty-two case sample—than the historic
383
publication rate of 7.4 percent.
Nevertheless, there is little
justification for not publishing most or all of the EADACPA cases,
even before the standards were relaxed in 2007. EADACPA was
passed in response to high levels of elder and dependent adult
384
abuse in society. It should be viewed, in almost every instance, as
385
involving “a legal issue of continuing public interest.”
Additionally, the new Rule 8.1105(c)(9) will require publication of
close cases like Trujillo, where a dissenting justice rejects the
386
majority’s view of professional negligence and elder abuse.
Perhaps the most important reason for publishing EADACPA
decisions is rooted in the reasons underlying Rule 8.1105(c)(2),
which “[a]pplies an existing rule of law to a set of facts significantly
387
different from those stated in published opinions.”
As Mr. Carney explained, most of the EADACPA cases involve
questions of the duration of the abusive or neglectful behavior, and
the knowledge, or lack thereof, held by the health care
professionals regarding the treatment of the elder or dependent
380. Id.
381. Compare Massey v. Mercy Med. Ctr. Redding, 103 Cal. Rptr. 3d 209 (Ct.
App. 2009), with Renko v. Northridge Care Ctr., Inc., Nos. B173512, 175474, 2005
WL 2045352 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 25, 2005).
382. Carney, supra note 17 at 44; see also CAL. RULES OF COURT, R. 8.1105.
383. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 349, at 16 (giving average
publication rate for the courts of appeal of 7.4 percent for the period 1999–2005).
384. Stafford, supra note 9, at 704.
385. CAL. RULES OF COURT, R. 8.1105(c)(6).
386. See id. (noting that an appellate decision should be certified for
publication if it “[i]s accompanied by a separate opinion concurring or dissenting
on a legal issue, and publication of the majority and separate opinions would
make a significant contribution to the development of the law.”).
387. Id.
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388

adult. There are not yet enough cases delineating the standards
of these two common law criteria for either the bench or the bar to
have a clear idea of what constitutes too long a duration, or too
much knowledge of wrongdoing held by a health care practitioner.
The five days Ms. Reyes suffered in Trujillo contrast sharply with the
four or five weeks that Ms. Trengali suffered in Trengali; in Trujillo
the decedent’s son recovered because the health care practitioner
failed to provide care resulting in death by infection, whereas in
Trengali, the decedent’s children did not, because the nurses failed
389
to inform the physician of Ms. Trengali’s deteriorating condition.
The distinction between the cases is simply not clear. In
situations like this, the courts of appeal should publish all of the
EADACPA cases rather than falling back on what looks like a
reluctance to hurt elders or nursing homes by publishing cases with
complicated facts. Instead of trying to manage the development of
the case law, the courts of appeal, as an error-correcting court,
should release all but the most prosaic of EADACPA opinions for
publication, so that enough cases with significantly different facts
can further outline the contours of professional negligence versus
elder abuse and neglect committed by health care professionals.
The standard response from intermediate courts to such a
challenge is that non-judges do not understand the enormous time
390
and resources required to publish more opinions. The Advisory
Committee contended:
California is virtually unique in its constitutional
requirement that decisions by Courts of Appeal that
determine causes “shall be in writing with reasons stated.”
All other jurisdictions surveyed, except the State of
Washington, provide intermediate appellate courts with
some discretion to decide causes on appeal summarily,
without issuing opinions in writing and stating the

388. Carney, supra note 17, at 44.
389. Compare Trujillo v. Superior Court of Los Angeles Cnty., No. B155860,
2002 WL 1558830 (Cal. Ct. App. July 16, 2002), with Trengali v. N. Cal.
Presbyterian Homes, Inc. No. A094106, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 4742 (Ct.
App. Jan. 18, 2002).
390. See, e.g., Alex Kozinski, In Opposition to Proposed Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 32.1, 51 FED. LAW. 36, 37 (2004) (“[T]he proposed rule would make
more difficult our job of keeping the law of the circuit clear and consistent,
increase the burden on the judges of our lower courts, make law practice more
difficult and expensive, and impose colossal disadvantages on weak and poor
litigants.”).
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391

reasons.
In the twenty-two opinions squarely relevant to the inquiry in
this article, the time pressure argument is unpersuasive. The
twenty-two cases are fundamentally similar. All but a few of the
cases address relatively gruesome medical experiences suffered by
nursing home residents in the last weeks or months of their lives.
The cases are of similar length, with an average of 6583.3 words for
the six published cases and 6302.1 words for the sixteen
392
unpublished cases. They cite similar cases, including Delaney.
The stakes are high for litigators to have their appellate case
published. The Advisory Committee reported that:
Of the approximately 92 percent of cases overall that were
not certified for publication, only one-tenth of 1 percent
resulted in opinions issued by the Supreme Court. Of the
approximately 8 percent of cases in which the opinion
had been certified for publication, about 7 percent
393
resulted in a Supreme Court opinion.
Practically, without a published decision, access to an appeal to
the supreme court is nearly impossible, thus giving potential
credence to the suspicion that the courts of appeal shield decisions
394
from review through non-publication of opinions.
With all but
one of the twelve cases where the defendant was successful in an
EADACPA appeal remaining unpublished, a cynic could contend
that that the courts of appeal, consciously or unconsciously, shields
the health care industry from reversal in the supreme court by
choosing not to publish decisions in which the industry wins.
391. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 349, at 14 (citing CAL. CONST.
art. VI, § 14).
392. Bulk words is a relatively meaningless way to measure cases, but it goes to
the heart of one justification for unpublished cases—that published decisions take
longer to write. Of the twenty-two cases examined, there is no discernable
difference in content between the published and unpublished decisions. The two
longest decisions, Pagarigan and Renko, at 17,096 and 13,290 words respectively,
are much longer than Norman, the longest published decision. If these two outlier
opinions are dropped from the pool of unpublished decisions, the average length
is 5,302 words, which is still only 19.5 percent shorter than the average published
opinion. In this closed universe of cases, there is nothing to suggest that the
published opinions took longer to write than the unpublished opinions. This
quantitative analysis should not be extrapolated to others areas of law without a
similar, careful research process.
While this article critiques California’s
publication and citation prohibition rules, it does so within the context of a very
narrow scope of inquiry.
393. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 349, at 19.
394. Schmier & Schmier, supra note 348, at 250.
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While non-publication of defense victories may be tactically
beneficial to the defendants in a particular case, the California
Medical Association routinely petitions the appellate courts to
395
publish successful cases.
VI. CONCLUSION
There is a simple, first step toward resolving the muddling
impact that Rules 8.1105 and 8.1115 have on EADACPA: follow the
trend of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and allow
lawyers, justices, and judges to openly read and cite unpublished
decisions as persuasive authority but not controlling precedent.
Because of article VI, section 14 of the California Constitution,
which allows the supreme court to publish the opinions of the
supreme court and courts of appeal that it “deems appropriate”
and requires the appellate courts to determine causes “in writing
396
with reasons attached,” California is in a significantly different
position than the federal judiciary post-Anastasoff in regard to the
397
constitutionality of selective publication. The California Supreme
Court may simply be unwilling to give up this clear constitutional
mandate and adopt universal publication.
Nevertheless, the middle ground solution of allowing citation
to non-published opinions would likely address many of the
398
current complaints. First, ending the citation prohibition would
395. See Health Policy in the Courts, CAL. MED. ASS’N (Jan. 2007),
http://www.cmanet.org/member/upload/Acdept-cas.pdf (noting the California
Medical Association’s unsuccessful attempts to get cases such as Marron and
Norman depublished, and Reyome and Marchesano published).
396. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 14.
397. See Schmier v. Supreme Court, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 580, 584 (Ct. App. 2000)
(“The broad constitutional and legislative authority granting the Supreme Court
selective publication discretion manifests a policy that California’s highest court,
with its supervisory powers over lower courts, should oversee the orderly
development of decisional law, giving due consideration to such factors as (a) ‘the
expense, unfairness to many litigants, and chaos in precedent research,’ if all
Court of Appeal opinions were published, and (b) whether unpublished opinions
would have the same precedential value as published opinions.” (quoting People
v. Valenzuela, 35 Cal. Rptr. 314, 322 (Ct. App. 1978))).
398. For more analysis regarding citation prohibition rules, see Lee Faircloth
Peoples, Controlling the Common Law: A Comparative Analysis of No-Citation Rules and
Publication Practices in England and the United States, 17 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV.
307 (2007); Goering, supra note 347, at 27; and Stephen R. Barnett, No-Citation
Rules Under Siege: A Battlefield Report and Analysis, 5 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 473, 487
(2003) (reporting that a number of states discarded citation prohibitions since
2001, showing an “increasing recognition by state courts that they can make their
opinions citable without impairing performance of their judicial function. The sky

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol37/iss1/4

60

Mead: Unpublished Opinions and Citation Prohibitions: Judicial Muddling

266

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:1

give permission to the courts of appeal to do what most justices are
already doing in complicated matters such as medical negligence
and abuse of nursing home residents, which is to check the
decisions of other panels for persuasive authority. Second, ending
the citation prohibition would end the appearance of bias brought
about by suspicions that the courts of appeal use unpublished
decisions to avoid review. Physicians in California already have an
extremely low regard for the judicial system, which threatens the
pool of available physicians willing to work as attending physicians
399
in nursing homes and other care facilities. A less facially arbitrary
system for deciding which EADACPA cases are precedential may
decrease the distrust, but allowing at least citation to helpful
unpublished cases with similar facts would likely seem less
suspicious. Finally, ending the citation prohibition would limit the
gamesmanship of the bar regarding post-decision appeals for
publication and depublication based on trying to create helpful
legal climates for future cases.
California’s elders and dependent adults, and their families,
along with the health care practitioners who serve them, deserve a
clear, rational explanation of the meaning of recklessness and
neglect in order to be able to evaluate care and make wise choices
when problems arise.

does not fall.”).
399. Kapp, supra note 141, at 275.
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